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The objective of this thesis is to provide a description of 
and an explanation for the rise of the PRC's new policy 
concerning direct foreign investment as a new economic 
development strategy in the late 1970s. It is an inquiry into its 
historical background, the forces of tradition and change, the 
path of the rise of the nev policy, and the strategic design of 
'this policy. 
By investigating the historical development of direct 
. foreign investment in modern China and the PRC's attitudes 
towards direct foreign investment before 1978, the study proposes 
that four prominent forces of tradition prevented the PRC from 
utilizing direct foreign investment between 1949 and 1977. 
In explaining the rise of the new policy, the study poses 
five major factors and argues that these factors gradually 
subdued each of the four preeminent forces of tradition and 
contributed to the introduction of the new policy. 
This study suggests that the new policy was to use direct 
foreign investment to import foreign technology and managerial 
techniques in order to foster China's economic development. The 
design of the new policy and China's intense emphasis on 
technological and managerial modernizations at the eve of the 
introduction of new policy corroborate this conviction. 
This study, in addition, proposes that, despite the 
revolutionary change, there exists a historical continuity. 
Forces of tradition did not vanish, but still exerted a certain 
degree of influence on the new policy, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
To foreigners interested in making direct investment* in 
China, the, period between 1949 and 1977 vas a dark age. 
Throughout this period, the PRC did not allow any investors from 
capitalist countries to establish new enterprises in China. All 
the pre-Liberation foreign enterprises were gradually 
nationalized between 1949 and 1957. After the mid-1950s, even 
direct investment from overseas Chinese was also rejected. 
Although socialist countries could invest directly from 1949 to 
1977, only a total of eight joint ventures were founded, and 
there wre no vholly foreign-owned enterprises. In January, 1977, 
making direct investment in China was still a dream. That month a 
New China Nevs Agency correspondent stated that China "does not 
allow foreign investment to explore our national resources and 
never forms any joint ventures with the foreign countries" 
[JINGJI DAOBAO, Jan.19, 1977, p.9] Hovever, that dream was to 
become a reality. 
In 1978 f the PRC's attitude towards direct foreign 
investment underwent a revolutionary change. At the end of that 
year, Li Qiang, China's Minister of Foreign Trade, proclaimed 
* Direct foreign investment, as defined in this thesis, takes 
place when foreign citizens or governments invest their 
money, equipment, and technology in the enterprises of a 




that China had recently decided to admit direct foreign 
investment. [JINGJI DAOBAO, Dec.20, 1978, 6] Soon the government 
initiated several new measures to promote the influx of direct 
foreign investment. Four special economic zones were founded at 
Shenzhen, ^huhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province, and Xiamen 
in Fujian province, in July 1979 to provide foreign investors 
with a favourable investment environment and preferential 
treatment. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment was passed at the 
Fifth National People's Congress in the same month. These acts 
clearly demonstrate China's stance as well as its determination 
to accept direct foreign investment, China also hurried to absorb 
direct foreign investment. By the end of 1980, more than 360 
items of joint venture had been approved either by the State 
Foreign Investment Commission or by the" provinces and 
municipalities upon the Commission
1
s authorization. The total 
amount of direct foreign investment reached 1.5 billion U.S. 
dollars. There is little doubt that China intended to utilize its 
new policy concerning direct foreign investment (hereafter, the 
new policy) as a new economic development strategy. 
The new policy, which ushered in a new era for both China's 
economic development and its Sino-foreign economic co-operation, 
immediately captivated numerous scholars, particularly those in 
the field of social science. A great number of intensive studies 
on the various aspects of the new policy, such as its content, 
implementation, impact, and others were conducted and published 
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in the last decade. However, there have been very few discussions 
on how and why the new policy was adopted in 1978. Although some 
writers did address this question, they provided little 
historical evidence to support their vievs. For instance, David 
Brown, whose book "Partnership vith China: Sino-foreiqn Joint 
Venture in Historical Perspective" (147 pages) is the most 
comprehensive historical study on China's contemporary policy 
concerning direct foreign investment, wrote very little to 
substantiate his view that the new policy vas introduced by Deng 
Xiaoping. [Brown, D.G., 1986, 75-6] 
Mainly due to the lack of a historical study, several 
questions concerning the rise of the new policy have not yet been 
solved. No one doubts that China
1
s Policy of Opening to the 
Outside World commenced after the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held 
between December 18th and 22nd in 1978, but WHEN was the decision 
made? Another question is about what the causes were for the 
rise of the new policy. As China had rejected direct foreign 
investment, for twenty-nine years, there must have been some very 
powerful forces that had bound China to the pursuance of that 
policy. WHAT were these forces of tradition? Also, WHAT were the 
forces of change, which subdued the forces of tradition and led 
to the introduction of the new policy in 1978? China's major 
motivations for the utilization of direct foreign investment are 
also puzzling. According to Deng Xiaoping's speech on August 
18th, 1985, the most important benefits that China could procure 
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from the Sino-foreign joint ventures were advanced technology and 
managerial skills. [Deng, 1987, 124] Were these two really of 
utmost significance? Finally, WHAT remained unchanged after the 
rise of the new policy? According to David Brown, China's new 
policy concerning direct foreign investment after 1978 was 
samilar to the policies undertaken before 1949 in many ways such 
as the opening of new ports, the significance of Guangzhou, the 
role of overseas Chinese, the importance of foreign capital for 
developing the nation's energy resources, and others. [Brown, 
D.G., 1986, 131-141] But WHAT were the common elements that 
affected both the PRC's policy concerning direct foreign 
investment in 1949-77 and the present policy introduced in 1978? 
This study, which tries to provide answers for the above 
questions, may promote our tiiideratanding of the new policy and 
facilitate studies on the content, implementation, and 
development of China
f
s new policy. This thesis is an attempt to 
explain how and why China's new policy arose as a new economic 
development strategy. 
This thesis is grounded in historical method. Economic models 
are neither established nor used, since the models created by 
economists in capitalist countries are not relevant to socialist 
countries like the PRC. The major factors affecting China's 
economic policy are also mainly not quantitative. Instead, 
efforts are spent on garnering historical documents and using 
these documents to explain the rise of the new policy with 
respect to China's political, economic, technological, diplomatic 
7 
•• » 
and managerial development in and before 1978. 
This thesis consists of five chapters* Chapter 1 serves as 
a n
 introduction, while the next chapter examines the historical 
development of direct foreign investment between 1842 and 1977 in 
China. A summary of four forces of tradition, which prevented 
China from accepting direct foreign investment between 1949 and 
1977, is given at the end of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is a study of 
how these four forces of tradition gradually disappeared as 
China's internal and external environments changed and of how 
five major forces of changes developed and finally led to the 
introduction of the new policy. Chapter 4 describes the 
introduction and the design of the new policy. The design 
indicates that the new policy was produced by some of the forces 
of changes and that the new policy was a new economic development 
strategy. The last chapter is a conclusion, summarizing the five 
major forces of changes leading to the rise of the new policy and 
presenting remarks on China's motivations for the utilization of 





CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA, 1842-1949 
Direct foreign investment existed in China long before the 
1949 Communist takeover. As early as 1836, there were about fifty 
foreign trading firms handling mainly the opium, silver, and tea 
trade in Guangzhou in southern China. The foreign merchants 
were under the Qing Government's strict regulations. Since 1759, 
no foreigners could do business outside Guangzhou, nor could they 
possess any real estate. The Opium War (1840-42) vas Britain's 
attempt to break down the stringent limitations imposed by the 
Qing Government. The result was the opening of five treaty ports 
for FREE business activities. Since the scope of freedom was not 
clearly defined in the peace treaties, some British started to 
make direct investment actively in China. A publication factory 
was set up by a British publisher in 1843 in Shanghai and was 
followed by the establishment, of a number of foreign trading 
firms and facilities to serve, maintain and repair ships. In the 
1860s, foreign investors penetrated into China's manufacturing 
sector by establishing modern manufacturing enterprises, for 
instance, John .Major's first Western-style silk filature in 
Shanghai in 1860/ western tea factories in Taiwan in 1860's and 
Thomas Piatt's first soybean mill in 1869. [Brown, S.R,, 1919, 
189] In 1872, the first Sino-foreign joint venture, a bank, was 
founded. [Cao, 1986 f 10] In 1876,. British investors further 
completed a railway from Shanghai to Kangwan. It vas estimated 




* constituted. [Brown, S.R, 1979, 196] 
The ambiguity of the peace treaty concerning the freedom of 
foreigners to pursue business generated Sino-foreign disputes. 
While setting up modern factories in the 1870s, Chinese officials 
discovered that enterprises with direct foreign investment had 
contradictory interests. In 1878, the Chinese government stopped 
an American from opening the first modern cotton spinning mill 
in Shanghai by claiming that the treaties signed previously 
contained no provision for allowing foreigners to set up 
factories in China. [Paulson, 1968f 320-342]* After this, foreign 
investors and diplomats became nervous. The British firm of 
Butterfield and Swire, for example, decided in 1893 not to build 
a steam-power, bean-crushing mill in Newchwang, precisely 
because of the uncertainty about what the official Chinese 
response might be. Consequently, not many new foreign factories 
were established. It was estimated that between 1843 and 1894 
about 103 enterprises were founded by foreigners in China, of 
which less than 50 vere constituted after 1878. [Brown, 
S.R.,1979,196] The number of foreign firms in 1895 was about 
100, with assets of 28,000,000 yuan (see TABLE 1), 
* A historian discovered that some personal interest was 
involved in this event: Li Hongzhang and others had just 
been granted a ten-year monopoly on the production of a 
cotton textile mill by modern technology. See Feuerwerker, 
Albert,CHINA'S EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION, Cambridge, Mass., 
1958, p.210. — 
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t TABLE 1: MODERN INDUSTRY BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP, 1895 
Number of Rough Assets Number of 
Firms (yuan=Mexican $) Employees 
Foreign 100+ 28r000,000 34,000 
Chinese, government 20+ 19,000,000 20,000 
Chinese, private 100+ 6,000,000 30,000 
Source: CAPITALIST PRODUCTION RELATION IN THE OLD CHINA, (JIU 
ZHONGGUO Dr~TTWTHUYFTHElGUITAr~Q 丽 X l T 7 ~ ^ i j i . n g , 
1977, pp.7-9. 
The legal pfoblem was eventually resolved after the 
. Japan's defeat of China in 1895. That year China's diplomatic 
representative, Li Hong-zhang, who previously had stated that 
allowing foreign merchants to manufacture in China would deprive 
the Chinese people of their profits and hinder the operation of 
Chinese factories, [Li, H*Z” 1976, 127-8] unwillingly signed the 
Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1895, giving the Japanese 
permission to engage in manufacturing industries in China. 
Article 6 of the Treaty provided that "Japanese shall be free to 
engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open 
cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to 
import into China all kinds of machinery paying only the 
stipulated duties"• All articles manufactured in China by the 
Japanese were to be regarded, taxwise, as imports, which could be 
sold everywhere in China after the payment of a five per cent ad 
valorem import duty and another 2.5 per cent as transit dues. 
They would not be burdened with all the internal levies, 
especially the likin. The right was further implied in an article 




were interpreted as conferring upon nationals of the treaty 
Powers the privilege of establishing manufacturing factories in 
China. 
Following China's defeat by Japan, foreign powers demanded 
the monopolization of certain investment opportunities in 
particular parts of China. Between 1895 and 1899, China 
reluctantly granted foreign powers, namely Britain, Germany, 
France, Russia and Japan, special rights to build railways and to 
、 mine in several regions in China. 
The first half of the twentieth century in China was a 
period marked by the prosperity of direct foreign investment. The 
total amount of direct foreign investment soared from 503 million 
U.S. dollars in 1902 to 1.067 billion in 1914, and then to 2.483 
billion in 1930» [Myers, 1980, 148] Foreigners invested in 
various industries such as trade, railways and manufacturing, 
(see TABLE 2) They succeeded in dominating several industries, 
(see TABLE 3) For instance, from 1910 to 1920, foreigners ovned 
75 to 90 percent of modern coal mining and about 50 percent of 
the cotton textile industry. By 1933, foreign-owned firms 
produced 35 percent of the total value of production of 
manufacturing industries, [Myers, 1980, 149] Foreign 
participation was the most important in terms of market shares in 
the tobacco industry (63.3 percent in 1933). Foreigners vere also 
major producers of egg products (56.8 percent)f shipbuilding and 




» direct foreign investment mainly came from Britain (963.4 million 
US dollars)f Japan (874.1 million US dollars), Russia (273.2 
million US dollars), and the United States (150.2 million US 
dollars). In 1931, these four countries held direct foreign 
investment in the value of US $2,261 million dollars which vas 
about 90 % of all direct foreign investment. [Remer, 1968, 86] 
During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45, Japanese direct investment 
was dominant. After the Second World War, about 65 per cent of 
Japanese investment and most of Germany's were placed under the 
、 U.S.'s direct or indirect management, and the U.S.'s direct 
investment became unmatched« [Wang, Xu and Zhou, 1984, 82] 
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
FROM BRITAIN, JAPAN, RUSSIA AND THE USA IN 
CHINA IN 1931* 
Field Percentage 
Transportation 24.8 % 
Import and Export Trade 21.4 % 
Manufacturing 16.5 % 
Real Estate ‘ 14.0 % 
Banking and Finance 9.5 % 
Mining 4.8 % 
Public Utilities 4.4 % 
Miscellaneous 4.6 % 
Source: Rerner, C.F, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA, 




. TABLE 3: NATIONALITY OF CAPITAL INVESTED IN SHANGHAI INDUSTRIES, 
1 9 2 8
 (in Chinese Silver Dollars) 
Chinese Foreign 
Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Textile 45,087,250 22,8 152,676,800 77,2 
Chemical 7,394,680 78.9 1,976,900 21.1 
Food 25,892,760 52.1 23,822,200 47.9 
Printing 10,457,100 93.6 615,791 6.4 
Water k Electic 
Works 8,930,000 47.2 10,000,000 52,8 
Others 5,861,010 86.8 880,000 13.2 
All Industires 103,622,800 35.3 189,979,691 64.7 
Source: SHANGHAI INDUSTRIES (SHANGHAI GONGYE), Shanghai Bureau 
、 of Social Affairs, 1930. 
Since the late nineteenth century, there have been two 
contradictory opinions in China on the role of direct foreign 
investment in China's economy. One is that the influx of direct 
foreign investment, had deleterious effects on China
1
 s economy 
because foreign investors, with more capital, superior technology 
and advanced managerial skills, outdid the domestic Chinese 
investors, dominated China's economy and hindered China's 
economic development. [Hon, 1961, 435] However-, the opposite view 
is that direct foreign investment had positive impacts. For 
instance, Zhong^  Jian, an entrepreneur in the early twentieth 
century, advocated that foreign capital should be utilized to 
promote Chinese industries and recommeded Sino-foreign joint 




, The Nationalist Government in the 1930s and 1940s believed 
in utilizing direct foreign investment. After the abolition of 
the system of extraterritoriality in 1931, Chinese laws and 
regulations became applicable to all factories within the 
territory of China. The government accorded national treatment to 
foreign factories, with only one exception. The Factory Law of 
1929 required a factory council to be formed in each factory. The 
council was to be composed of representatives of the employers 
and the workers. The employer
1
s representatives vere selected by 
、 the employer and, the workers of the factory were entitled to 
elect their representatives, but non-Chinese were not eligible. 
[Wang, T.Y.,1945, 49-50] Aliens also received national treatment 
in banking. Discriminatory treatments mainly existed in a few 
commercial activities. In the insurance business, the exchange 
business, and the mining industry, the majority of the members of 
the Board of Directors r as well as the managing directors in 
the Sino-foreign joint ventures, were required to be Chinese, and 
most of the shareholders had to be Chinese. Most of the railways 
had to be owned and controlled by Chinese. In 1945, there were 
only two foreign railway concessions: a French line running from 
Haiphong to Yunmanhu and a British line running from Kowloon to 
Shenzhen. [Wang, T.Y., 1945, 39-48] 
In 1943, the government was determined to treat foreign 
investors as domestic investors by releasing most of the above 
limitations. After, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth 




t adopted a resolution encouraging direct foreign investment as 
follows: 
"To show a spirit of close cooperation with China,s 
friendly powers, all restrictions applying to Chinese-
foreign joint enterprises shall be revised. Hereafter 
no fixed restriction shall be placed on the ratio of 
foreign capital investment in joint enterprises. In 
the organization of a Chinese-foreign joint 
* enterprise, except for the chairman of the board of 
directors, the general manager need not necessarily 
be a Chinese..." At the same time, aliens, in 
accordance with provisions of Chinese lavs and 
regulations, and having received the sanction of the 
Chinese Government, may finance their ovn enterprises 
in Chinese." [Wang, T.Y,, 1945, 61] 
W.Y. Lin, [1945, 44-5] Director of the Research Department 
of the Bank of China at Chongqing in the 1940s, provided an 
explanation for the release of restrictions. He stated in 1945 
that although direct foreign investment played an important role 
in China's industrial development, "the Chinese laws, which place 
restrictions on joint enterprises with respect to the ratio of 
share-holding, the majority of directors and the nationality of 
the Chairman of the Board, have made joint ventures less popular 
and less attractive". He advocated that all foreign enterprises 
duly registered with the Chinese government should be accorded 
16 
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national treatment and that, as "the profits of foreign 
* 
enterprises were often reinvested into business for the purpose 
of expansion, the inflow of foreign capital should not. be 
handicapped by any limitation on profits or restrictions upon 
their remittance abroad". [Lin, 1945, 19] To him, "the fears of 
、：imperialistic domination', though easily comprehensible in the 
light of past history, are now, with the abolition of extra-
territoriality and the special rights associated with it, 
irrational and groundless." [Lin, 1945, 44] 
On November 4, 1946, the National Government signed the 
Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to 
allow U.S. nationals to reside, travel, and carry on commercial, 
manufacturing, processing, scientific, educational, religious and 
philanthropic activities, to explore and exploit mineral 
resources, to lease and hold land, and to follow various 
occupations and pursuits in China. [Mao, 1961, vol,.4, 126] As the 
treaty accorded the U»S. citizens national treatment, the U.S. 
investors could make direct investment freely in China. 
In summary, with the support of imperialism, direct foreign 
investment penetrated into China after 1842 and prospered in the 
first half of the twentieth centuty. The Nationalist Government's 
policy favouring direct foreign investment in 1929-48 also 
contributed to the prosperity. 
17 
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PRC'S POLICY CONCERNING DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1949-77 
Between 1949 and 1977, the basic principle of the Communist 
Government, unlike the National Government in 1929-48, was to not 
utilize direct foreign investment. In the first stage, 1949-57, 
the Communist Governemnt gradually nationalized all the pre-
Liberation direct foreign investment, welcomed overseas Chinese 
direct investment, unwilling set up four Sino-Soviet joint 
ventures, and founded one Sino-Polish joint venture. In the 
second stage, 1958-77r direct investment from capitalist 
countries and overseas Chinese was prohibited and there were only 
four enterprises with direct foreign investment in China. 
A fev months before the founding of the People
1
s Republic of 
China, Chinese communists' actions and Mao Zedong's speech had 
made it clear that direct foreign investment could hardly exist 
under communist rule. In February 1949, the Chinese Communist 
Party closed down foreign banks and froze their funds in 
Tientsin. [Thompson, 1979, 13] In March, Mao Zedong made a 
momentous announcement, Dissatisfied with the - concentration of 
capital in the hands of "the imperialists and the Chinese 
bureaucrat-capitalists", he declared that the proletariat 
government would confiscate this capital in order to "control the 
economic lifelines of the country and enable the state-owned 
economy to become the leading sector of the entire national 
economy."[Mao, 1961, vol.4, 367] His announcement offered one 
18 
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crucial reason for the communist confiscation of direct foreign 
investment — to build a state-owned economy. 
Apart from the determination to build a state economy, the 
confiscation also reveals the communists' suspicious attitude 
towards foreign powers, Mao Zedong thought that direct foreign 
investment, was a conspiracy by foreign powers to colonize China. 
In his summary of the intention and activities of foreign powers 
in China, Mao stated in 1939 that foreigners, ultimate aim was to 
transform China into their semi-colonies or colonies and so the 
foreign powers waged wars against China, forced China to sign 
many unequal treaties, divided China into several spheres of 
influence, and ran "many light and heavy industries in China in 
order to make immediate use of China's rav materials and cheap 
labour". To him, direct foreign investment had exerted economic 
pressure oil China's domestic industries and hampered the 
development of China's productive forces. [Mao, 1961, vol.2, 311] 
The formation of his viev can be explained partly by the 
historical development of direct foreign investment in China. As 
mentioned before, China was forced to open her door in 1842, to 
legalize direct foreign investment in 1895 and to grant mining 
and railway construction rights to foreign powers between 1895 
and 1900. Its economy therefore suffered from the domination of 
direct foreign investment in the first half of the twentieth 
century. It is therefore not a surprise that the Chinese 
communists were suspicious of foreign powers' intentions of 




With this association between direct foreign investment and 
imperialism, Mao seriously criticized the National Government's 
policy favouring direct foreign investment. He stated in 1936 
that the Communist Government, if established, would pursue a 
policy different from the one adopted by the National Government• 
There would be no recognition of those foreign investment which 
harmed China's independence. The Communist Government would only 
recognize and accept those foreign direct and indirect investment 
promoting China*s ability to produce — especially in those 
fundamental industries and organizations introducing foreign 
scientific agricultural methods. [Sinuo, 1979, 131] Angered by 
the Sino-U,S, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
signed by the National Government in November 1946, Mao condemned 
Jiang Jieshi as a person betraying China and Chinese merchants. 
He complained that "because Jiang Jieshe's bureaucrat-comprador 
capital has become linked with U.S. imperialist capital through 
the notorious and treasonable Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce, 
malignant inflation has swiftly developed and China's commerce 
and industries tended to collapse" and concluded that the treaty 
was "the most treasonable treaty ever known" [Mao, 1961, vol.4, 
121], 。 
Although Mao stated in 1936 that the Communist Government, if 
established, would accept those direct foreign investments 
promoting China's production ability, his desire to extinguish 
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imperialism in China was so strong that he could not endure the 
existence of direct foreign investment, which was regarded as a 
conspiracy by foreign powers to colonize China. He stated in 1939 
that imperialism was the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the 
Chinese people. [Mao, 1961, vol.2, 315] As eradicating 
imperialism in China was the principle work of the Chinese 
Communist Party, he included nationalization of all the large 
enterprises of the imperialists in his new democratic revolution. 
[Mao, 1961, vol.2, 327] 
For the above two reasons, direct foreign investment could 
hardly escape from being confiscated. Howeverr the Chinese 
Communist Party was in no hurry• In March 1949, Mao Zedong 
thought that "the remaining imperialist economic and cultural 
establishments" could be "allowed to exist for the time being, 
subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by us 
after (our) country-side victory." The urgent step in March and 
the following months vas to "refuse to recognize all the 
treasonable treaties of the Guomindong period" and to "take 
immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs 
system", [Mao, 1961, vol.4, 370] This means that a temporary 
existence of pre-Liberation direct foreign investment was 
endured. Propaganda was thus put forward in 1*949 to urge foreign 
merchants, industrialists and bankers to remain in areas likely 
to come under Communist control as their assistance was needed in 
developing China's trade. [Thompson, 1979, 13] However, fearing 




foreign investment' many foreign investors departed from China. 
The number of remaining foreign enterprises in late 1949 vas just 
more than one thousand; most of them belonged to Britain and 
the USA, while the others belonged to France and ten other 
countries. [ZSKYJ, 1978, 69] In August 1950, China's Liberation 
Daily News announced that foreign enterprises vould be permitted 
to exist and would be protected if they could dutifully obey all 
ordinances and rulings of the Chinese government and engage in 
business which was beneficial to the livelihood of the Chinese, 
[LIBERATION DAILY, August 6, 1950] The ordinances were very harsh 
and only favoured the Chinese government which made operations 
unprofitable for the firms. For instance, closure of businesses 
was not permitted without explicit permission from the Chinese 
government, and firms were not in control of their labour policy. 
[Thompson, 1979, 21-25] Nonetheless, direct foreign investment 
persisted. 
In the early 1950s, some foreign interprises were 
confiscated as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950. Avenging the U«S. declaration on December 16, 1950 to put 
all China's public and private properties in the U.S. under the 
control of the U.S. government, the Chinese Communist Government 
officially took control of all U.S. property in China on December 
29. [Wang, H.Y., 1988, 441] Since Britain supported the United 
States in the Korean War, its oil and aeroplane enterprises in 
China vere also confiscated on April 30, 1951. [Wang, H.Y., 1988, 
276] Oil May 15, 1951, China announced it was going to use large 
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foreign capitalist enterprises, manage the smaller ones, buy some 
if necessary and more strictly control the others. 
In 1952, the Chinese government considered it the right time 
to expel foreign enterprises by allowing them to leave. 
Negotiation of the terms of closure between the foreign firms and 
the Chinese government began. However, China's
 x
yes' in response 
to foreign firms' applications for closure only came gradually, 
and the terms were very unfavourable to the foreigners. 
Nonetheless, a lot of foreign firms gained permission to close 
down in 1953 and 1954. [Thompson, 1979, 51-7] The number of 
foreign capitalist enterprises was thus reduced from 1,192 in 
1949 to 563 in 1953, while the number of workers employed 
was reduced from 12.6 million to 2.3 million and the capital 
invested dropped from 12.1 million to 4.5 million. By the end of 
1952, direct investment from capitalist countries had almost 
disappeared. [ZSKJY, 1978, 70] Foreigners were very discontented 
with China's policy in dealing with direct foreign 
investment. Some thought that anti-imperialism vas the major 
factor for this policy. Lucian Taire, author of Shanghai Episode: 
the End of Western Commerce in Shanghai published in 1957, felt 
that the Chinese communists "intended to eliminate foreign 
influence and to demonstrate to its people that China could 
humiliate, exploit, and finally expel the citizens of the great 
Western powers without any action by the West. [Taire, 1957, 57] 
With the nationalization of foreign capitalists' enterprises in 
the 1^ .(1^ 19505, direct investment from capitalist countries 
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disappeared in China and did not return until 1978. 
象 
Because of the dearth of historical materials, it is not 
possible to discuss how the PRC dealt with the pre-Liberation 
Soviet direct investment. According to the limited materials 
available, it seems that Soviet investors were also obliged to 
withdraw but received better treatment. For instance, a Soviet 
investor, who was burdened by the taxation of the Chinese 
government and whose fur shop was closed down, got back a 
considerable part of his stock. Also, a Soviet factory owner 
left China with sixty large pieces of luggage. [Taire, 1957, 67-
68] The major reason for better treatment is probably that the 
Soviet Union was China's intimate ally, furnishing political 
support against capitalist countries and providing economic and 
technological aid for China
1
s economic reconstruction and 
development. 
The PRC's policy concerning new Soviet direct investment is 
much more apparent. Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 
went to Moscow in December, 1949, to seek political and economic 
assistance, and succeeded in procuring a Sino-Soviet military 
alliance and a low-interest Soviet loan amounting to 300 million 
US dollars with an annual interest rate of only one percent 
(government loans are a form of indirect investment). However, 
the Soviet Union also successfully maintained its influence in 
Xinjiang Province and Dalian in China as China reluctantly 
promised to set up four new Sino-Soviet joint ventures. 
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The first two Sino-Soviet. joint ventures were established in 
March 1950, the third in April 1950 and the last one in July 
1951. They were as follows: 
1. Xinjiang Nonferrous and Rare Metals Stock Company -- for the 
mining of nonferrous and rare metals in Xinjiang, China. 
2. Oil Stock Company -- for the prospecting、 extraction and 
refining of petroleum, gas and subsidiary petroleum 
products in Xinjiang, It was empowered to search for and 
produce nonferrous metals and oil, respectively, in that 
area. 
3. Civil Aviation Company — for flying three main air routes 
between the tvo countries along the lines Chita-Beijing, 
Irkutsk-Beijing, and Alma-Alt-Beijing. 
4. Dalian Ship Repairing and Building Company — for the 
building and repair of ships in Dalian, China. 
The first three firms were set up on a parity basis, both sides 
participating equally in capital investment and administration. 
The capital investment for these three firms was 7.18, 11.6 and 
42.0 million U.S. dollars respectively. The Soviet Union vas to 
supply machinery equipment, operation equipment and related 
technology while China provided land, factory, construction 
facilities and materials. Administrative power was shared through 
a SyStem of alternating key posts between Chinese and Soviet 
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. officials. The companies also set up training programs for 
Chinese "technical and administrative personnel". Chinese 
citizens were sent to technical schools and courses organized by 
these firms, and some were sent to learn in the Soviet Union. It 
was agreed that the first three joint ventures would last for 
thirty years and the last one for ten years. [Sladkovskii, 1966, 
242] 
At the first glance, the Soviet direct investment benefitted 
China* According to the Soviet-Chinese Communique of the 
Transfer to the PRC of the Soviet Share in the Joint Soviet-
Chinese Companies, announced in 1954, the formation of the Sino-
Soviet joint ventures was to assist China in rehabilitating the 
national economy, restarting the enterprises incorporated in the 
companies, substantially enlarging China's producing capacity, 
and generally improving China's technical efficiency by drawing 
on Soviet advanced experience. Wu De-xiuf head of the Office of 
the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Sino-USSR talk in 1950, 
also mentioned the positive economic and technological effects of 
the Sino-Soviet joint ventures. He stated that the oil industry 
in Xinjiang needed foreign investment and technology, and that 
the Xinjiang provincial government had sought Russian 
participation in the investigation and exploitation of oil fields 
as early as 1930s. There were more than twenty oil fields and a 
great deposit of metals such as gold (the amount of deposit of 
pure gold was estimated to be above 60 million taels)# copper, 
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 "incapable of getting them" and so had to "seek 
Russian aid". [Wur 1983, 29] However, the scrutiny of Soviet 
established interests in Xinjinag and Dalian reveals that the 
Soviet Union was the principal beneficiary in the founding of the 
Sino-Soviet joint ventures, 
The Soviet influence in Xinjiang grev rapidly in the 1930s. 
The Islam revolt between 1930 and 1934 coerced the Xinjiang 
provincial government to turn to the Soviet Union for support. In 
1931, it signed a secret trade agreement with the Soviet Union, 
which almost turned Xinjiang into a Soviet colony. The Soviet 
Union guaranteed its currency with a huge loan of silver and 
dominated trade in Xinjiang. In the area of mineral exploitation, 
Soviet geologists in the Duahanzi area discovered oil and 
constructed an oil refinery, and in 1940, a fifty year 
concession agreement gave the Soviet Union the rights to mine for 
tin. [Sladkovskii, 1966, 209] The Soviet Union also had a 
tremendous interest in Dalian. The base Dal'dok plant used by 
Dalian Ship Repairing and Building Stock Limited Company was in 
fact originally built by Russians in 1903 and reconstructed by 
the Soviet military administration in 1946. [Sladkovskiir 1966, 
242] From this point of viev, the Sino-Soviet joint ventures in 
Xinjiang and Dalian represented Chinese concessions to the Soviet 
demand for influence in these two areas. [Schwartz, 1964, 147] 




. in maintaining its influence in the area around Changchun 
Railway. The Sino-Moscov talk in 1950 was indeed a meeting of 
conflicting interests between China and the Soviet Union. As 
recorded by Wu De-xiu, China's "relation vith the USSR is of 
equality and mutual benefit as a whole, but at the same time 
there is friendship and contradiction, cooperation and struggle, 
[Wu, 1983, 20] In addition to Xinjiang and Dalian, Changchun 
Railway was a source of dispute. At the end of the talks, China 
failed to recover a complete control of the Changchun railway 
immediately, but had to accept Sino-Soviet joint operation. In 
this case, the Soviet Union made use of joint management, instead 
of direct investment. Wowever, no matter which method was 
employed, China had to endure the existence of Soviet influence 
within its boundary. With regard to the arrangement of Changchun 
Railway, Wu expressed his discontent as follows: 
"After the establishment of our government, the USSR should 
have handed over the sovereignty of the Railway without 
reserve. However, because they could take shorter time if 
they use the Changchun Railway to Hai Can Wei instead of the 
Far East Railway within their own country, they demanded a 
share sovereignty and profit of the Changchun Railway vithin 
a definite period. In fact/ the USSR got more in this case." 
[Wu, 1983, 11] 
Since the Soviet aim of establishing the Sino-Soviet joint 




 China ran the joint ventures carefully. For instance, China 
opposed the Soviet proposal for enlarging the area of oil fields 
for the Sino-Russian Oil Stock Company by claiming that it 
violated the joint venture agreement because it meant a lateral 
(China's) increase in investment.[Wu, 1983, 22-23] However, to 
China, the best way to check 七he Soviet influence was to 
terminate the joint ventures. Eventually a brilliant chance came 
when Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader after Stalin's death, 
visited China in 1954 to give China a more equal position. One 
result of his visit was that both sides agreed to transfer all 
Soviet shares in the four Sino-Soviet joint ventures to China, 
The transfer took place on January 1, 1955. The value of the 
shares was to be repaid over a period of years in the form of 
deliveries of commodities which were customary items of Chinese 
export to the Soviet Union. Thus the enterprises incorporated in 
the Sino-Soviet joint ventures became completely state-owned 
enterprises of the PRC. [SINO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, 1954] After the 
disappearance of these four joint ventures, the USSR had no 
direct investment in China between 1955 and 1977. 
During the first stage (1949-57), China also accepted a 
little new direct investment from another socialist country, 
Poland. Sino-Polish Ship Share Company was founded in January 
1951. The capital investment was 20.5 million U.S. dollars, 
shared equally by the two countries. As only one Sino-Polish 
enterprise was established, it is impossible to say that China 
utilized Polish direct investment to develop her technology and 
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^ economy. China's intention of founding this enterprise was 
probably just to facilitate the transportation between China and 
Poland and to promote the Sino-Polish relationship. 
During the first stage (1949-57), the PRC accepted direct 
investment from overseas Chinese, who were regarded as patriotic 
capitalists* The new government even urged them to invest. In 
1949, Liu Shaoqi promised the Chinese investors at Tientsin that 
nationalization of Chinese private enterprises would not occur, 
[Sun, 1990, 401-408] Also, Huang Changshui, Commissioner for 
Overseas Chinese Affairs in the early 1950s,, announced in Hong 
Kong in 1950 that the new government would offer wholehearted 
protection and assistance to overseas Chinese investors. He 
persuaded overseas Chinese to hurry and directly invest in China. 
[Huang, C.S.f 1950, 82-83] 
Private enterprises, including those in which overseas 
Chinese had invested, played a significant role in China's post-
liberation economy. In 1949, the total number of private firms 
was about 123,000, with an industrial output of 63.2 percent of 
the national total. [ZSKJY, 1978, 44] More than three-quarters of 
wholesale and retail sale, by value, came from these private 
enterprises, although most of these enterprises were small in 
size. [Ecklund, 1963, 238] However, under communist rule, the 
importance of these business gradually declined. In 1952, the 
number of private enterprises rose from 123,000 to 149,600, but 
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industrial output dropped to only 39 percent of the national 
total. [ZSKJY, 1978, 44] In the mid-1950s, the PRC began 
nationalization of all private Chinese firms by tranforming them 
to state enterprises, completing the process by 1956. [ZSKJY, 
1978, 240] Thus, at the end of the first stage, no overseas 
Chinese direct investment survived. During the second stage 
(1958-77), overseas Chinese could invest only indirectly. The 
lavs issued in 1957 allowed them to own shares, but not to manage 
enterprises. [Lin, J,Z., 1989, 146] 
At the end of the first stage (1949-57), with the 
disappearance of pre-Liberation direct foreign investment, the 
fall of the four Sino-Soviet joint ventures and the 
transformation of the enterprises owned and managed by overseas 
Chinese in the mid-1950s, only one enterprise, Sino-Polish Ship 
Share Company, had any direct foreign investment. This company was 
also in operation throughout the second stage (1958-77) [XINHUA 
MONTHLY JOURNAL, Aug. 1979, 40] Between 1958 and 1977, China did 
not accept any wholly foreign-owned enterprise and it founded 
only three new Sino-foreign joint ventures: 
1. Sino-Czechoslovakia Sea Transportation Company, established 
in 1959. 
2. Sino-Albania Ship Stock Company, founded in 1961. 
3. Sino-Tanzania Joint Sea Transportation Company, set up in 
1966. [Wang, H.Y., 1988, 224] (which still existed in 
1979 [XINHUA MONTHLY JOURNAL, Aug.1979, 40]) 
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Like Sino-Polish Ship Share Company, the above three joint 
ventures promoted transportation and friendship between China and 
its respective partner. As there were only four enterprises with 
any direct, foreign investment (the above three and the Sino-
Polish Ship Share Company) during the second stage, we conclude 
that China, as in the first stage (1949-57), did not utilize 
direct foreign investment to expedite its economic development 
between 1958 and 1977. 
Why did China adopt such a policy during the second stage? 
China's plan to establish a centralized socialist economy and the 
Chine$e communists' suspicious attitude towards foreign powers --
the two forces which had prevented China from utilizing direct 
foreign investment during the first stage were still powerful. 
Even in 1977, as mentioned in Chapter 1, a news correspondent 
stated that the founding of Sino-foreign joint ventures might 
lead to colonization of the Chinese economy by foreign countries. 
However, these forces were not the only ones shaping China's 
policy duting the second stage. 
The adoption of a self-reliance strategy in the late 1950s 
was also a significant force. In the 1930s and early 1940s, the 
Chinese communists dealt with the unfavorable environment in 
Yunan by r.elying on local simple machines and primitive 
technology available. For instance, the communist soldiers in 
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1943 supplied themselves with all necessities and daily products. 
[Schran, 1975] Because of this successful experience, Mao was 
confident of the "self-reliance" strategy and said on January 10, 
1945 that "we stand for self reliance. We hope for foreign aid 
but cannot be dependent on it" [Mao, 1961, vol,3, 240] 
In the 1950s, the PRC put aside the self-reliance strategy 
and relied heavily on Soviet technology to set up a firm economic 
and technological base. [Shuang, 1973, 320] About 50 to 70 
percent of the equipment required for China's 156 key 
construction projects was supplied by the Soviet Union. According 
to official Soviet statistics, the Soviet Union supplied 
Communist China with some $3 billion worth of equipment and 
machinery from 1950 to 1962. [Zheng, Z,Yvr 1964, 30-1] 
In 1958, the self-reliance strategy was re-employed. After 
the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress held in May 
1958, China began to emphasize the use of indigenous production 
methods^  During the Great Leap Forward campaign, native and 
simple technology in production in medium to small scale 
enterprises was developed to save construction and operation 
costs. For instance, ceramic and glass equipment replaced metal 
in the, chemical industry while small and locally designed 
furnaces were built in the iron and steel industry. People were 
mobilised in the labour-intensive enterprises. Small-scale 
industry in rural areas, where little capital and only simple 
indigenous production methods were available, was greatly 
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promoted. [Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970, 320] 
After the sudden withdrawal of the Soviet technical 
assistance in 1960 (see next chapter)y self-reliance became 
China's dominant economic development stragety. Between 1960 and 
the mid-1970s, China imported a very small amount of technical 
equipment, mainly from capitalist countries. From 1961 to 1966, 
a total number of 84 items of technical equipment in various 
industries, such as the oil industry, the chemical industry, the 
mining industry, and others, was imported. Between 1967 and the 
early 1970s; native production methods were widely used. Workers 
were encouraged to mechanize processes through modifications 
suggested by themselves, whereas copying foreign machine design 
was identified with the technocratic bias of the Right-wing. 
Small, self-reliant enterprises were promoted wherever possible. 
For example, in the Shanghai Diesel Pump and Motors Plants, three 
out of the five workshops made all their own lathes. During their 
sp^re time, workers made many lathes, screws, and small spray 
heads from scrap iron and copper. [Wheelwright and McFarlane, 
1970, 164-7] 
The adoption of the self-reliance strategy had substantial 
influence on China's policy towards direct foreign investment 
during the second stage. As the Chinese government stressed 
relying on domestically produced raw material' machines, money' 




Another force hindering China's acceptance of direct foreign 
investment during the second stage vas the domestic political 
environment. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), some 
Chinese leaders like the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan) opposed the use of 
foreign technology t.o modernize China. Although Zhou En-lai, an 
influential political leader in the first half of the 1970s, 
succeeded in encouraging technology imports in the early 1970s, 
his main supporter, Deng Xiaoping, lost power immediately after 
his death in 1976* Deng was seriously condemned as a person who 
openly and excessively respected foreign things, therefore 
violating the principles of "independence, self-determination and 
self-reliance't [JINGJI DAOBAO, May 19, 1976, 29] His antagonists 
claimed that importation of foreign technology would put China's 
technological development and economy under the control of 
foreign monopolized capital. [HONGQIf 1976, no.7, 56] Due to the 
great political forces opposing technology importation, direct 
foreign investment was impossible because it involved importation 
of foreign capital, technology and managers. Deng Xiaoping, 
himself, stated on September 16, 1978, two years after the fall 
of the Gang of Four, that "while Comrade Mao was still 
alive,…v/e wanted to develop economic and trade relations with 
qertain capitalist countries and even to absorb foreign capital 
and undertake joint ventures", but JDeng could not implement them 





attempt at economic relations with other countries as 
/.worshipping things foreign and favning on foreigners' and as 
^national betrayal'". [Dengr 1964, 142] 
In summary, there were four major forces contributing to the 
PRC's rejection of direct foreign investment between 1949 and 
1977. The first one was that the Chinese communists nationalized 
those enterprises with direct foreign and domestic investment for 
the sake of a centralized socialist economy. All enterprises thus 
became state-owned and were expected to carry out state plans. 
Foreigners and overseas Chinese, like domestic Chinese, were 
prohibited to own or manage enterprises in China. 
The second force vas the Chinese communists' suspicious 
attitude towards foreign powers. Since foreign powers in the 
nineteenth century compelled China to provide a favourable 
investment environment, the Chinese communists regarded direct 
foreign investment as a conspiracy by foreign powers to turn 
China into a semi-colony, Therefore, they hated and rejected it. 
These two forces, to . a large extent, explained why China 
eliminated all pre-Liberation direct foreign investment in the 
1950s and accepted only an extremely small amount of direct 
foreign investment between 1949 and 1977. 
After 1957, two additional new forces preventing the PRC 
from absorbing direct foreign investment emerged. One vas the 
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self-reliance strategy, As China heavily emphasized relying on 
its own resources and native primitive technology to develop its 
technology and economy between 1958 and the mid-1970s, it did not 
consider direct foreign investment. Another new force was the 
political condition in China between 1966 and 1976. Owing to the 
opposition of those political leaders who condemned importation 
of technology and capital, reformers, like Deng Xiaoping, found 
it difficult to introduce a policy utilizing direct foreign 
investment. 
The next chapter will describe and explain how the forces of 
change emerged and hov they subdued the above four forces of 
tradition and eventually led to the introduction of China's new 




CHAPTER 3: FACTORS IN THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY 
1) POLITICAL CHANGE, 1976-1978 
The political environment before October 1976, as pointed 
out in the previous chapter, , was unfavourable for China's 
acceptance of direct foreign investment, since there existed 
influential political leaders like the Gang of Four who did not 
f avoiir foreign technology. However, after the drastic and 
dramatic political changes between 1976 and 1978, particularly 
the fall of the Gang of the Four and the rise of Deng Xiaoping, 
direct foreign investment became an acceptable means to modernize 
China. . 
1976 vas an eventful year in the political history of the 
PRC, marked by a series of tremendous changes. One of the most 
influential leaders, Premier Zhou Enlai, died on January 8. Soon 
after his demise, Deng Xiaoping dropped out of sight and on 
February 6 the Renmin Ribao carried a front page article 
attacking the "unrepentant powerholders" who "took the 
capitalistic road". The next day the Chinese government 
announced the appointment of Hua Guofeng, the sixth-ranking vice 
premier and minister of public security, as acting premier. 
Following the Tienanmen Incident, Deng was dismissed from both 
party and government on April 7. On September 9, China's top 
leader, Mao Zedong, passed avay. On October 6, the Gang of Four 
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was arrested. The next day Hua Guofeng was confirmed as the 
chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 
In December, the Chinese government issued charges against the 
Gang of Four. [Hsu, 1983, 4-22] 
With the fall of the Gang of Four, one major obstacle to 
utilization of direct foreign investment disappeared. Those who 
favoured technology importation were free to advocate 
absorption of foreign technology through the expansion of foreign 
trade. On January 2, 1977； a New China News Agency correspondent 
seriously criticized the destruction of foreign trade by the Gang 
of Four and advocated an increase in volume of trade with 
various countries in order to import technology, equipment and 
other resources vhich China needed. [JINGJI MOBAO, Jan. 19,1977, 
10] However, as the traditional belief that direct foreign 
investment was a conspiracy by foreign powers to colonize China 
had not yet disappeared, China's acceptance of direct foreign 
investment did not occur immediately after the fall of the Gang 
of Four, The correspondent just mentioned persuaded readers 
to accept trade expansion by stating that it would not result in 
the colonization of China's economy by foreign powers as 
foreign countries were not allowed to exploit China's resources or 
to set.up Sino-foreign joint ventures, [JINGJI MOBAO, Jan. 19, 
1977, 10] Also, on April 1, 1977, at a meeting with the Japanese, 
the Chinese side was recorded as saying that China planned to 
observe the following three principles: 
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* ⑴ China will not accept assistance from other 
countries,; 
(2) China will not accept investment from other countries丨; 
and 
(3) China will not accept loans from other countries. 
[CHINESE NEWSLETTER, Oct.1977] 
Although there was no immediate acceptance of direct foreign 
investment after the fall of the Gang of Four in October 1976, 
the fall reduced the obstacles hindering China's utilization of 
direct foreign investment, and so paved the way for the 
absorption of direct foreign investment in 1978, 
Another important political change was the return of Deng 
Xiaoping between 1977 and 1978. On July 21, 1977, he was restored 
to all his former posts — Politburo Standing Committee member, 
vice-chairman of the Central Committee, first deputy premier of 
the State Council, vice-chairman of the Military Commission, and 
chief of the General Staff of the Liberation Army -- each a top 
position in its respective field. More import'antly, after the 
Fifth People's Congress held between February 26 and March 5, 
1978, he became the first deputy premier in charge of the Four 
Modernizations (agriculture, industry, national defense, and 
science and technology). His protege, Fang Yi, vas put in charge 
of the development of science and technology, the basis for the 
other modernizations. Another supporter, Yu Qiuli, an economic 
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' 30-33] Deng's rise completely changed the history of 
direct foreign investment in the PRC‘ In 1978, he "emancipated" 
the minds of the Chinese and put forward his policy utilizing 
direct foreign investment. 
Although only a few historical documents concerning Deng 
Xiaoping,s ideas about direct foreign investment in and before 
1978 are available, they clearly show that Deng had favoured 
utilization of direct foreign investment before Li Qiang's formal 
announcement of China's acceptance of direct foreign investment 
on December 15, 1978. As early as September 16, 1978, Deng 
mentioned that he had contemplated absorbing foreign capital and 
undertaking Sino-foreign joint ventures when Mao Zedong vas still 
alive,. He added that it was impossible for him to act on it at 
that time because of the embargo imposed on China by capitalist 
countries and later the opposition of the Gang of Four. [Deng, 
1984, 142] This source indicates that he had considered 
utilizing direct foreign investment before September, 1976. On 
December 13, 1978, two days before Li Qiang's announcement, Deng 
talked about the policy utilizing direct foreign investment, 
which was to be introduced soon. He said, "so as to make sure 
that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership 
changes, or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the 
focus of their attention,……we must concentrate on enacting 
criminal and civil codes, procedural laws and other necessary 
laws concerning factories, people's communesr forests, grasslands 




.. investment by foreigners." [Deng, 1984, 158] This source reveals 
that he regarded the nev policy concerning direct foreign 
investment as a very important policy. These two sources clearly 
reflect Deng's advocacy of accepting direct foreign investment 
before the introduction of the new policy. 
In order to change the traditional attitude towards direct 
foreign investment, Deng Xiaoping began a campaign to 
"emancipate" the minds of the people before carrying out his 
economic reforms. Throughout 1978, he seriously attacked 
ideological taboos and 'forbidden zones'. He stated that the 
emancipation of minds was a primary task because China's "drive 
for the four modernizations will get nowhere unless rigid 
thinking is broken down and the minds of cadres and of the masses 
are completely emancipated". [Deng, 1984, 154] His campaign 
received vide support among Chinese political leaders and so 
succeeded within just a few months. At the end of 1978, his 
speech "Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as 
one in looking to the future" became the most important document 
in the Third Plenary Session. [Deng, 1984, 151] Although Deng did 
not specifically mention direct foreign 。 investment, his 
discussion of "emancipation of minds" was broad enough to include 
it . Owing to Deng's emancipation of minds and advocacy of 
utilizing direct foreign investment, the Chinese government 
accepted direct foreign investment in
4
 December 1978. 
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‘ 2) INCREASING EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGY IMPORTATION 
In addition to the political changes, the change in China's 
attitude towards technology importation between 1973 and 1978 was 
a significant factor contributing to the rise of the new policy. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, the self-reliance strategy, which 
had hindered China's acceptance of direct foreign investment, 
gradually declined* From 1973 on, China increasingly emphasized 
technology imports. As more and more foreign technology was 
purchased between 1973 and 1978, the government started to search 
for inexpensive and effective means to procure advanced foreign 
technology. Eventually, in 1978, it adopted direct foreign 
investment as one of the several new means. 
The self-reliance strategy adopted between 1960 and the 
mid-1970s had failed to expedite China
1
s technological and 
economic development. In the early 1970s, China remained 
impoverished and- backward. The mining industry still relied on 
simple methods of coal extraction, while many other countries 
used large complex machines. China's steel industry had to import 
more than 2 million tons of steel annually. Its chemical fibre 
industry was especially backward; chemical fibre made up only 5*5 
percent of fibre resources, far below the 40 percent in advanced 
countries. The limited supply of cotton fabric constrained the 
production of cotton clothes. China's annual cotton production 
was about 200 million tons. National cotton cloth storehouse 




‘ 1972. The chemical fertilizer industry was also backward, relying 
on imports; in 1972, China vas the largest importer of nitrogen 
fertilizer (22 percent of the world trade). [Yan, 1988, 147] 
Low productivity and slow technological development pushed 
the Chinese government to re-utilize foreign technology. In 1973, 
the imports of machinery and equipment amounted to US $860 
million, the highest since I960, representing 6 to 8 percent of 
China's own machinery and equipment production. Purchase of whole 
plants valued 1.259 billion US dollars, (see TABLE. 4 below) Over 
3,000 foreign technicans and engineers were invited to China 
between 1973 and 1977 to assist with the construction of foreign 
plants and the set-up of machinery and equipment. For instance, 
Pullman Kellogg of the United States agreed in 1973 to send about 
150 technicans to China to construct eight ammonia plants. China 
also signed certain franchise agreements and accepted royalty-





 PLANT PURCHASE (US$ million)* 
Machinery & Complete 
Total Total Balance Equipment Plant 
Year Exports Imports of Trade Imports Contracts 
1966 2210 2035 175 455 0 
1967 1960 1955 5 380 0 
1968 1960 1825 135 275 0 
1969 2060 1835 225 240 0 
1970 2095 2245 -150 395 0 
1971 2500 2310 190 505 0 
1972 3150 2850 300 520 0 
1973 5075 5225 -150 860 1259 
1974 6660 7420 -760 1610 831 
1975 7180 7395 -215 2155 364 
1976 7265 6010 1255 1770 185 
1977 7955 7100 855 1220 80 
1978 10260 10650 -390 2500 6934 
* The figures are expressed in current dollars and consequently 
have an upward bias due to inflation and the decreasing 
exchange value of the dollar since 1973, 
Source: CIA, CHINA: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1977-78 (Washington, 
D.C,#1978) and various earlier issues. 
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were two key figures in China's 
transition from a country relying on it to one which relied 
rather heavily on foreign technology. Zhou maintained that China 
should focus on modernizing its industry, agriculture, national 
defense, and science and technology» At the National People's 
Congress in 1975, he proclaimed China's goal: 
"…“ to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and 
technology before the end of the century, so that our 
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 great attention to the modernization of science 
a n d
 technology. He put his .supporter, Deng Xiaoping, in charge of 
supervising a complete reorganization of science and technology; 
Hua Guofeng was vice-premier in charge of science and technology 
and Deng's confidant, Hu Yaobang, took over the Academy of 
Science. These three pushed forward the modernization of science 
and technology. 
To achieve the modernization of science and technology, Zhou 
Enlai placed great emphasis on taking advantage of foreign 
technology. With the intention of using foreign technology as a 
model for improving China's technology and production, he 
developed a strategy to utilize foreign technology: (1) obtain 
and use a sample of the new foreign product； (2) criticize its 
applicability to Chinese conditions; (3) convert and adapt it to 
perform optimally; and (4) eventually create an equivalent 
domestic product, eliminating the need for further imports. 
[Bohdan and Szuprowicz, 1978, 44] 
Deng • Xiaoping gave his full support to Zhou's policy 
concerning foreign technology. On August 18, 1975 he stressed the 
significance of importing new technology and equipment from other 
countries, especially, high-grade, high precision and advanced 
technological equipment. [Deng, 1984, 44] However, probably due 
to the unfavourable political environment and the traditional 
attitude towards direct foreign investment, the time was not 
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ripe for him to advocate utilization of direct foreign 
investment. Some foreign merchants at that time observed that 
China was not ready to accept Sino-foreign co-production 
agreements and joint ventures. [Kretschmar, 1974, 429] Instead, 
Deng recommended an expansion of foreign trade to procure foreign 
technology. His strategy was to export more in exchange for more 
foreign technology and equipment. He cited coal industry as an 
example. He thought that China could sign long-term contracts 
vith other countries to import their mining technology and 
equipment and could pay them back with coal. Three advantages in 
using this method were pointed out: first, to expand China's 
exports; second, to bring about the technical transformation of 
the coal-mining industry and third, to absorb more of the labour 
force. [Deng, 1984, 44] 
Zhou and Deng's advocacy of technology importation suffered 
a temporary setback in 1976. As mentioned before, soon after 
Zhou
1
s death in January 1976, Deng was seriously condemned by his 
opponents. However, immediately after the fall of the Gang of 
Four in October 1976, technology importation was emphasized more 
than ever tefore. 
In 1977, a number of articles advocating technology 
importation appeared. An article in January stated that China 
should use "exports to obtain needed materials in return and to 
import needed equipment and technology in an effort to implement 
the principles of
 4




. combining learning with creation to enhance China's ability to 
build socialism with independence, initiative, and self-reliance 
and accelerate the socialist construction". [JINGJI DAOBAO, Jan 
19, 1977, 9] Ail article in July further justisfied technology 
importation as follows: 
"every nation and country as it develops is bound to absorb 
and make use of, to a greater or lesser extent, scientific 
and technological achievements of other nations and 
countries"" Presumptuous conceit and blind rejection of 
all thing foreign are anti-Marxist and unscientific ... We 
dare to put. forvard the slogan of learning from foreign 
countries precisely because we have full confidence in our 
own country". [BEIJING REVIEW, Apr. 7, 1978, 13] 
China's emphasis on technology importation, reached its 
climax in 1978. At the First Session of the Fifth National Party 
Congress in February, 1978, China proclaimed a plan to enable 
China to reach the 、front ranks' of the world at the end of the 
century. This plan resurrected Zhou Enlai's call for Four 
Modernizations, According to the plan, by the year 2000 China 
would have achieved parity or superiority in output of major 
industrial products with respect to the advanced industrial 
countries. To achieve this grandiose goal, the government planned 
to build or complete 120 large-scale projects, including 10 iron 
and steel complexes, 9 non-ferrous metal complexes, 8 coal mines, 
10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, 5 harbours, and so on. 
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^ State revenues and capital construction investments in the Ten 
Year Plan (1976-86) would both be equivalent to the total for the 
preceding 28 years. [Yu, 1984, 30] Importation of foreign 
technology played a key role in this plan. A large amount of 
technology and equipment w^ re to be imported• Japanese economists 
in touch with Chinese planners in 1978 estimated that over $70 
billion of plant, equipment., and technology imports would be 
required for the Plan's various projects.. [Riskin, 1987, 259] By 
the end of 1978, China had negotiated or signed contracts for 
plants and equipments in excess of US$ 7 billion, and 
TECHIMPORT, China's foreign trade corporation responsible for 
plant and technology purchases, alone had negotiated for or 
expressed interest in about $40 billion worth of complete 
industrial plants. [Simon, 1982, 530] The greatest volume of 
technology purchase took place in December 1978; during only ten 
days of that month, contracts amounting to almost $3 billion for 
the whole plant imports were signed. [Riskin, 1987, 260] 
The mounting emphasis on technology imports between 1973 and 
1978 was a significant factor leading to the introduction of the 
new policy in December 1978. With more emphasis on technology 
importation, the Chinese government paid more attention to two 
important aspects of the various means to acquire foreign 
technology — COST and EFFECTIVENESS. Eventually, in 1978, the 
government accepted direct foreign invesment because it was an 
inexpensive and effective means to procure foreign technology. 
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Between 1973 and 1978, China adopted a costly means to 
import technology — straight purchasing. In exchange ： for 
technology, China paid the technology suppliers foreign exchange 
earned mainly from its exports. However, as an underdeveloped 
country, it gained only a little foreign exchange from its 
exports, which were mainly composed of agricultural products and 
minerals. In consequence, trade deficit developed, when China's 
imports increased greatly in 1978, In 1976, China's trade 
surplus was 1.255 billion US dollars, but when the import value 
soared from 7.1 billion in 1977 to 10:65 billion US^  dollars in 
1978, (her export value increased from 7.955 billion in 1977 to 
10.260 billion in 1978) there was a trade deficit of 390 million 
US dollars in 1978. (See TABLE 4 on page 45) It was clear that a 
less costly means to import foreign technology was needed. 
In mid-1978r China initiated and encouraged compansation 
trade. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Apr.4, 1978, 47] In this 
form of trade, foreigners supply production equipment/ technology 
and possibly technical personnel plus the necessary parts and 
components of the product to a Chinese factory or enterprise. In 
return, the Chinese recipient pays the foreigners an agreed 
quantity of finished products to cover the technology, equipment 
and profits as stipulated in their agreement. If repayment in 
this , form is difficult, the foreigners are paid indirectly by 
means of other commodities or a combination of both. [Chu, 
D.K.Y., 1985, 4] Obviously, the chief benefit to China is that it 
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, c a n "import foreign technologies and equipment without using 
cash". [Yu, G.Y., 1984, 698] Some foreign firms showed interests 
in this new form of trade. In one case, for example, the German 
firm of Konrad Hornschuch agreed to build two petrochemical 
plants in China (total value $21 million) and to accept 50 
percent of their annual output in the first five years as 
payment. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov.8, 1978] In another, Itoman & 
Company of Japan provided materials, equipment, and advice to a 
Shanghai textile plant in return for the right to market its 
entire output. However, not many foreigners were attracted. In 
1978, less than 100 factories were actually built. The 
investments were all less than HK$ 10 millions and the number of 
workers employed in each of these factories was only between 30 
and 200. The activity was limited to the area near Hong Kong. 
[Zheng, Z.Y., 1980, 45] Some foreigners feared that they would 
lose money if the Chinese side did not complete the construction 
work as scheduled. [JINGJI DAOBAO, Jan.24, 1979, 32] Thus, China 
had to continue to introduce inexpensive means• Eventually, in 
December, 1973, Li Qiang proclaimed China's adoption of two means 
—government loans and direct foreign investment. 
Government loans are a form of indirect foreign investment 
and, if the interest rate is very low, a form of aid. In the 
1950s, China utilized a lot of Soviet loans to purchase Soviet 
technology. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union promised to 
construct 291 major industrial installations in China and 
for the close Sino-Soviet friendship, it signed six trade 
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‘ agreements with China: the first and third one dealt with 
a long-term loan worth 430 million U.S. dollars and the other 
four allowed China to purchase the Soviet machinery and 
technology with deferred payments. [Usack and Batsavage, 1972, 
344] By the end of 1959, equipment valued at $1.35 billion had 
been delivered and about 130 projects were completed. The total 
value of the Soviet machinery and technology export to China was 
over 222 million US dollars. Unfortunately, in 1960, the Soviet 
Uriion nullified hundreds of Sino-Soviet agreements and contracts, 
stopped lending money to China and demanded an immediate 
repayment. From 1965 on, the PRC did not borrow any money from 
foreign governments. Between 1965 and 1978, it repeatedly 
condemned those powers which used their loans to exploit the 
developing countries. For instance, an article in May 1976 
descibed how the Soviet Union in the first half of 1950s coerced 
Egypt and India to repay money immediately. [JIANGJI DAOBAO, 
Jun.2, 1976, 7] However, in order to meet the demand for 
inexpensive means to acquire foreign technology, China re-
utilized government loans in December 1978. 
China also acccepted direct foreign investment in December 
1978. As discussed in details in Chapter 2, it did not utilize 
direct foreign investment to expedite its technological 
development between 1949 and 1978. However, as a result of the 
mounting emphasis on technology importation between 1973 and 
1978, it became willing to consider direct foreign investment as 
an inexpensive means to procure foreign technology. As stated by 
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, some Chinese officials, one major advantage in founding Sino-
foreign joint ventures was that China need not spend money to 
acquire foreign machines and technology,, which were parts of 
foreign investment, [Chu and Dong, 1986, 40] 
With the acceptance of compensation trade, government loans 
and direct foreign investment in 1978, the PRC saved money and 
imported more technology. Consequently, its increasing demand for 
foreign technology was met, However, China continued to spend a 
lot of foreign exchange to purchase foreign technology. In order 
to earn more foreign exchange, it started export processing in 
1977 and promoted its tourist industry in 1978. In the form of 
export processing, foreign firms supply the necessary raw 
materials, semi-finished goods, components, and so on, to the 
Chinese firms which process, transform or assemble in accordance 
with the requirements, design and specification stipulated by the 
foreign contractors. The finished products revert to the foreign 
contractors and the Chinese firms receive processing fees. In the 
tourist industry, more than 700,000 tourists visited China in 
1978, of which 400,000 were Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao, 
200,000 were overseas Chinese from elsewhere, and 100,000 were 
foreigners. [BEIJING REVIEW, Jail.12 and Mar.6, 1979] The number 
of the latter group was said to be three times as large as that 




In addition to cost, effectiveness of the various means to 
import advanced foreign technology was of concern to the Chinese 
government. 
The PRC experienced a successful importation of advanced 
foreign technology in the 1950s. During this period, it received 
the Soviet generous supply of advanced technology. The Soviet 
Union delivered about 10,000 sets of specifications, including 
more than 1,250 designs for capital construction, 4,000 
blueprints for manufacture of machinery and equipment, and more 
than 4,000 sets of technological and department specifications, 
to China. Soviet specialists also flocked to China. Some 11,000 
of them took part in China's construction work. They were engaged 
either in design and planning, as well as in assembling, 
constructing and launching of enterprises built according to 
Soviet plans and supplied with Soviet equipment, or in assisting 
the Chinese in executing similar tasks according to Chinese 
designs and plans. The majority of the Soviet specialists 
participated in China's factories, mining projects, and 
communications. At least twenty were assigned to each of the 156 
major industrial projects constructed with Soviet aid, The Soviet 
Union also provided technical assistance in the form Qf training 
for Chineses students, technicians and scientists in Soviet 
universities, factories, and research organizations. In the 
1950s, more than 38,000 Chinese had studied in these places. 
[Zheng, Z.Y., 1964, 35-9] For the Soviet generosity, China's 
production in heavy industry expanded at an average annual rate 
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of 25 percent between 1952 and 1959 and the groundwork for the 
production of sophisticated items, such as jet aircraft, large 
electrical generating equipment and machine tools, was laid. 
The Soviet Union even supplied China with advanced military 
technology. Its technical information and training of Chinese 
technicians created a base for the development of China's 
advanced weapons program in the 1960s. [Usack and Batsavage, 
1974, 344] Unfortunately, the Soviet Unioh terminated its 
technical aid in 1960. Its technicians withdrew, taking their 
blueprints with them, and no further equipment was supplied. 
After the withdrawal of the Soviet aid, China found it 
difficult to procure advanced foreign technology. Between 1960 
and 1978, it was used to purchasing foreign whole plants. It 
tried to study and imitate the technology contained in the 
plants. Hovever, exploration of the contained technology vas 
extremely difficult. As the organization and equipment within 
these plants had been fully integrated into a working system by 
the engineering architects of the plants, the Chinese technicans 
and engineers could hardly sort out particular components, copy 
them, and economically integrate them within a different 
production system. [Simon, 1980, 552] Thus, whole plant purchase 
was： not an effective means to acquire foreign technology. 
In 1978, the Chinese government realized the significance of 
importing technical know-how. An article in MiiiM Review, for 
instance, stated that China needed "hens'
1




. and should stop paying too much attention on "eggs" (whole plants 
and machines). [BEIJING REVIEW, Dec 8, 1978, 13-16] However, 
advanced technical knov-hov could not be purchased easily. 
Generally speaking, the owners of technology were reluctant to 
vend their most advanced technology to purchasers, even though 
the latter were willing to pay more money. They kept the most 
advanced technologies secret and used them. Secret technologies 
were called proprietary technologies. What they were willing to 
sell were patent technologiesr which were registered and less 
advanced. 
As the above means were ineffective in importing advanced 
technology/ China sought nev means. As early as October, 1977, Yu 
‘ Qiuli stated that China should try to find out economical and 
effective means to import necessary advanced technical equipment. 
[JINGJI DAOBAO, Nov.2, 1977, 5] In mid-1978, China started 
compensation trade; however, by the end of that year, it had 
proved ineffective as a lot of machines imported through this 
means were old, [Zheng, Z.Y., 1980, 45] Eventually, in December 
1978, China accepted direct foreign investment. The government 
hoped that foreign venturers would use their secret advanced 
technology as their investments in Sino-foreign joint ventures 
and disclose them to the Chinese partners, [Chu and Dong, 1986, 
41] It was also hoped that direct foreign investment could 
enable China to acquire the very latest technology in certain 
fields such as offshore oil drilling. [Tidrick, 1986, 41] 
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In short, In order to meet China's increasing demand for 
foreign technology, China adopted direct foreign investment in 
1978 as an inexpensive and more effective means to import 
advanced foreign technology. Details about how China utilized 
this means are given in the next chapter. 
3) RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMY ‘ 
The third factor leading to China's acceptance of direct 
foreign investment in December 1978 was the restructuring of 
China's economy. In 1978, in order to raise economic efficiency, 
the Chinese government replaced its highly centralized economy 
built in the 1950s by a less centralized economic structure, in 
which foreigners could own and manage enterprises. 
China's highly centralized economy took shape between 1949 
and 1957. From 1949 to 1952, China's economy was still very 
decentralized. Although the bureaucrat-capialist entreprises were 
confiscated and turned into state-owned enterprises and land 
reform was completed, the industry and commerce controlled by the 
'national bourgeoisie
1
 and the individual economy had not yet 
been transformed. During this period, the government implemented 
a policy of a unified control and leadership throughout the 
country. All localities and departments had to place their 
financial and economic work under the unified control of the 
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 to have a division of labour and coordination under the 
guidance of the state-owned economy. During the First Five-Year 
Plan (1953-7), a centralized economic management structure 
patterned after the Soviet model gradually emerged. Except for 
those in North China, industrial enterprises had been placed 
under the control of the greater administrative areas before 
1953. In 1954, the big state-owned enterprises were further 
placed under the direct leadership of the central departments. 
Plans for the state-owned industry, transport and communications 
and capital construction vere laid down chiefly in the form of 
mandatory directives for the grass-roots level to fulfil. 
Agriculture, handicrafts industry, the capitalist industry and 
commerce were more and more under the direct control of state 
plans. Also, all enterprises in which foreigners and overseas 
/ 
Chinese had directly invested, as described in Chapter 2, were 
nationalized. The localities and enterprises had few rights and 
the higher departments had the final say in such matters as 
labour arrangement, finance, production, marketing of their 
products, and so on. [Yur 1984, 75-6] 
From 1957 on, China's economy was entirely based on the 
public ownership of the means of production, vhich took two 
forms: the ovnership by the whole people (or state ownership) and 
collective ownership. Both vere -subordinated to the central or 
local administrative institutions and so enterprises had no 
autonomy. [Yu, 1984, 85-86] Foreigners and overseas Chinese were 
deprived of their pre-Liberation rights to own and manage 
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. enterprises. 
In 1978, the Chinese government put an end to this highly 
centralized economic system, because the system had created many 
serious problems hindering China's economic development. One of 
the problems was the dearth of initiative within an enterprise. 
As enterprises were mere appendages of administrative organs at 
different levels, and their relative independence had been 
negated, the enterprises did not have any initiative. [Ma, 1983, 
94] Another problem was that the enterprises did not feel any 
economic responsibility. They paid no attention to economic 
resultsf as they had to turn over all their revenues to the state 
and, in case of loss, received government subsidies. Managers and 
'workers showed no enthusiasm for cutting costs, improving the 
quality of products or increasing variety、 to meet consumers' 
needs, [Yu, 1984, 97] Furthermore, the highly centralized 
structure, in which mandatory plans were issued by the higher 
administrative to the lower level without leaving any room for 
the role of market mechanism, was incompatible with the 
complicated and changeable needs of the society. [Yu, 1984, 95] 
In order to solve these problems, the government initiated 
several measures to restructure its economy in 1978. 
One important measure was to allow other economic sectors to 
coexist with the socialist public ownership. The nev economic 
system consisted of economic sectors with varying degrees of 
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public ownership (that isf sectors under the ownership by the 
vhole people and those with fairly high or relatively low levels 
of collective ownership), economic integration in various forms, 
the urban and rural private individual economy, and the non-
socialist economic sector. [Yu, 1984, 104-5] As the non-
socialistist economic sector, vhich referred to enterprises with 
direct foreign investment, were allowed to exist, domestic 
Chinese and foreign investors could directly invest in China 
again. 
Another measure initiated in 1978 was the transfer of 
managerial power from the government to the enterprises. In 
October, 1978, six industrial enterprises in Sichuan were granted 
the eight managerial rights on an experimental basis; 
(1) Right to retain part of the profit. 
(2) Right to expand production vith funds accumulated by 
the enterprise. 
(3) Right to retain 60 percent of the depreciation fund for 
fixed assets, as against 40 percent in the past. 
(4) Right to engage in production outside the state plan, 
only after the state plan has been met. 
(5) Right to market their own products which the commercial 
or materials departments do. not purchase. 
(6) Right to contract vith foreign governments to export 
their products and to reserve part of the foreign 
exchange earnings for the import of new technology, 
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. rav and other materials, and equipment. 
(7) Right to issue bonuses at the enterprise's own 
discretion within the guidelines approved by the 
state. 
(8) Right to penalize those who incur heavy losses to the 
state due to negligence in work or other subjective 
reasons. [BEIJING REVIEW, Apr.6, 1981, 23-24] 
This granting marked the beginnning of China's enterprise reform. 
By the end of 1978, the number of experimental enterprises 
quickly multiplied to 100. To a certain extent, the enterprise 
reform facilitated China's acceptance of direct foreign 
investment, as the granting of enterprise autonomy to Sino-
foreign joint ventures was consistent with it. In 1979, Sino-
foreign joint ventures were given the following rights: 
(1) To make decisions on their own development programme, 
production-management plan and labour-wage plan 
(report to be submitted to the competent, authority and 
local labour department for the record): 
(2) To buy the required raw materials, fuel and equipment 
including components, spare parts and accessories 
directly from domestic and international markets and 
to sell the products on these markets according to the 
provisions in the contract the partners signed. 
(3) To sign various economic contracts with domestic and 
foreign companies and enterprises, and fulfill their 




⑷ To raise RMB and foreign exchange funds from internal 
and external financial institutions for production and 
management; to open accounts in RMB and foreign 
currencies in the Bank of China or other banks 
endorsed by it with the freedom of depositing drawing, 
raising and spending the funds by themselves. 
(5) To establish their own financial management and other 
management systems; to determine their own profit 
distribution programme as well as the financial budget 
and final account of revenues and expenditures, 
(6) To hire and fire employees; to adopt the system of pay 
scale, wage-form, bonus and allowance systems they 
consider appropriate for rewarding and punishing 
employees. 
(7) To take necessary measures to renovate and reform 
production techniques, to diversify products and to 
improve their quality and raise output according to 
the provisions laid down in the contracts and articles 
of association, to buy additional fixed assets with 
the funds accumulated by themselves and to expand the 
scale of production and operation. [Wei, 1982, 
18-9] 
In consequence, foreigners were not merely allowed to own 




Chinese government, the granting of enterprise autonomy to Sino-
A 
foreign enterprises might, benefit China's enterprise reform, as 
the operation of these enterprises provided some hints on 
enteprise reform; [Chu and Dong, 1986, 45] 
4) NEW ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN POWERS 
The 1970s witnessed a rapid change in China's attitude 
towards foreign powers. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Chinese 
communists in the 1950s were suspicious of foreign powers and 
regarded direct foreign investment as a conspiracy by foreign 
powers to exploit China's economy. However, in the early 1970s, 
owing to the advance in its military industry and the changes in 
international environment, China started to cast its mistrust 
away and to treat capitalist powers as friends and economic 
partners. The new attitude and improved foreign relation 
facilitated the founding of joint ventures between China and the 
capitalist countries* 
Remarkable advance in China's military industry occurred in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In the nuclear industry, nuclear research 
and development programs commenced in the mid-1950s. With 
substantial Soviet assistance in the 1950s, [Pollack, 1977, 38-
41] China successfully exploded its first nuclear device in the 
Takulamakan desert area in Xinjiang in October 1964. A nuclear 
weapon which included heated nuclear material was experimented in 
May 1966. Ever since the original successful event, the pace of 
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» Chinese development of strategic weapons had been dramatic. The 
time span until an operational test of a missile's nuclear 
warhead at the same location was only two years and eleven days. 
A time frame of only two years and eight months was needed before 
the PRC detonated a hydrogen bomb over its test site in mid-1967. 
By 1977, China's production of nuclear bombs alone reached 300 
units and by 1979 missile warhead deployment requirements 
appeared to call for 180 reentry vehicles. The PRC nuclear weapon 
research and development before 1978 had resulted in 23 nuclear 
explosions and the utilization of various means, such as tower 
devices, aircraft drop, guided missiles and underground 
facilities, in the explosions, [Hahnf 1980, 19-22] 
Besides nuclear weapons, the other aspects of China
!
s 
defense industry developed fast. In 1949, Chinese weapons 
inventories consisted exclusively of captured Japanese, U.S., and 
Guomindang stock, combined with whatever production domestic 
factories could furnish as well as Soviet aid. Through grants, 
transfers, and purchases during the Korean War, China rapidly 
built a modern national defense force — with especially 
pronounced results in the creation of an air force and modem 
infantry and armored units, Following the end of the Korean War, 
attention turned to the creation of manufacturing facilities 
under Soviet license. By the late 1950s, these plants were 
producing military equipment in virtually all categories of need, 
including jet aircraft. After the withdrawal of Soviet advisory 
assistance, Chinese scientists and engineers undertook 
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^ independent management of all armed plants. By the mid- to late-
1960s, China had resumed production in all key defense facilities 
without foreign management or control. Thus, by this time China 
had achieved self-sufficiency in most areas of defense 
manufacture, This included the ability to 、reverse engineer' key 
veapons systems for which only prototypes or limited supplies 
were available, such as the TU-16 intermediate bomber. [Pollack, 
1980, 247-8] 
Possessing nuclear weapons and other defensive weapons, 
China was able to defend herself against foreign invasion and so 
became less fearful of increasing contacts with the capitalist 
powers and allowing foreigners to directly invest in China. 
The changing international environment also affected the 
Chinese communists' attitude towards foreign powers. The most 
significant change was the growing Soviet threat in the 1960s, 
China and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance in 1950, 
but their relation deteriorated after 1955. In 1956, Khrushchev 
sought friendship with Chinas enemy, the United States, 
violating Mao Zedong's "united front" doctrine. From 1958 on, 
Sino-Soviet disputes arose on many affairs, such as disagreements 
on the Great Leap Forward, the Taivan Straits Crisis of 1958, the 
Soviet repudiation of the Sino-Soviet secret agreement of 1959 
for the building of nuclear weapons for China with Soviet aid, 
Khrushchev's surrender in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 
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1962 and partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (signed vith the US and 
Britain on July 25, 1963), China's rejection of the Soviet 
proposal to establish a "united front" line against the U.S. in 
1965, and so on. After the emergence of the Cultural Revolution 
in 1966, Sino-Soviet relation further declined as the Soviet 
Union supported pragmatists in China. [Michael, 1969, 155] In 
1969, China used the term "social imperialism" to refer to the 
Soviet Union, [BEIJING REVIEW, Mar.28,, 1969] In March, Sino-
Soviet relation reached the lowest point when the Sino-Soviet 
military border clash at Damansky Island broke out. In April, Lin 
Piao's report to the Ninth National Congress of the Chineses 
Communist Party treated the Soviet Union as China's primary 
enemy. [BEIJING REVIEW, Apr. 18, 1969, 26] In the spring of 1969, 
extensive, realistic, and costly preparations for war with the 
USSR were begun and rushed forward; stockpiling of grain and 
strategic materials, the expansion of and acceleration of the 
training of the militia, the digging of bomb and fall-out 
shelters, dispersal of critical industries to the countryside, 
and so on. In addition to the Sino-Soviet conflict, China was 
also aggravated by the U.S, new policy in Asia. The Nixon 
Doctrine of 1,969, which hinted that the U.S. would withdraw its 
forces from Vietnam and East Asia, alarmed the Chinese Communists 
because it would result in a power vacuum as well as an increase 
of Soviet threat in East Asia. [Wang, G.W.f 1977, 125] 
In' face of the changes in international environment, China 




to be friendly with them in the early 1970s. The most 
spectacular change was its rapprochement with the United States. 
The rapprochement deterred a Soviet strike against China. Also, 
by using barbarians to oppose barbarians, China was benefitted 
from a global structure of power in which the two superpowers 
vere in a state of intense rivalry and confrontation, although 
not necessarily at war, [Garver, 1982, 151-3] Simultaneously, the 
United States was determined to abandon its hostile attitude 
towards the PRC. Thus, Sino-American relation was soon 
normalized. China
1
s Vice-foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua, made it 
clear on November 29, 1970 that the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence applied to relations between all countries. [BEIJING 
REVIEW, Dec.4, 1970] On February 21, 1972, Nixon made a 
historical visit to Beijing, resulting in the signing of the 
Shanghai Communique. The two countries then started to have 
exchanges in science, technology, culture, journalism, and 
sports. China also improved her relations with other capitalist 
countries. It established diplomatic relations with Canada in 
1970, Australia and West Germany in 1971 and the United Kingdom 
in 1972. It was also recognized by Japan in 1972. 
The emergence of friendly relation between China and 
capitalist countries greatly promoted economic cooperation 
between China and these countries. American export to China, for 
instance, soared from US$ 64 million in 1972 to US$ 1.15 billion 
in 1974. The total value of China's foreign trade trebled from 




the mid-1970s, the Chinese communists had regarded the capitalist 
powers as economic partners rather than those who attempted to 
exploit China's economy. On the other hand, the capitalist 
countries were desirous of cooperating with China in economic 
affairs* Thus, the environment became favourable for the founding 
of Sino-foreign joint ventures. As cited by Deng Xiaoping on 
September 16, 1978, the good international conditions in 1978 
enabled China to "make use of capital from foreign counties and 
of their advanced technology and experience in business 
management". [Deng, 1984, 142] 
5) NEED FOR MANAGERIAL MODERNIZATION 
China
1
s need for managerial modernization also contributed 
to the rise of the PRC's new policy concerning direct foreign 
investment• Owing to the negligence of western managerial 
education between 1949 and 1977, China was confronted with a 
serious problem —一 managerial backwardness. Eventually, in 1978, 
it adopted Sino-foreign joint venture as a means to import 
advanced managerial techniques. 
Between 1949 and 1977, managerial education was seriously 
neglected. Before 1949, there was a few arts and commerce 
colleges or facilities and schools of business. For example, 
Jiaotong University had a business schoolf and Shanghai College 
vas a business school run by American missionaries. In the 1950s, 
the PRC destroyed the old capitalist business education system 
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、 and set up its own. Under the new system, only a few members of 
the business faculty were allowed, usually under controlled 
conditions, to continue teaching and researching. Others had to 
switch to educational fields, or professions, or to undertake 
ideological reeducation. Most of the faculty members that were 
educated abroad in business, finance, industrial management and 
other management areas were not allowed to teach in their field 
for close to three decades, from the early 1950s to the late 
1970s. On the other hand, the ex-capitalists were not utilized as 
they were treated with suspicion and this substantially hindered 
the transfer of management expertise from the ex-capitalists to 
the new, inexperienced managers» [Battat, 1986, 70-71] 
After 1952, China set up two types of narrowly defined 
management programs. The first type trained cadres in applied 
economics, finance and accounting, and, upon graduation, they 
worked as economic administrators in central and local government 
economic organizations, performing tasks that varied from 
drafting economic plans to interacting with enterprises on a 
daily basis. Management education at Zhongguo Renmin Daxue 
(China's People's University) represented this type of program. 
The other type of program provided technical and managerial 
training in the management of industrial— typically, 
manufacturing — enterprises. The development of this type of 
education is of concern to us and could be illustrated with the 
history of the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), a
 v
key' 
university. In 1954, HIT inaugurated the specialty of 
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^ "Organization, Planning and Economics of Machine-Building 
Enterprises". The next year it set up Engineering Economics 
Department, which included two management programs. Both the 
teaching and research in this department progressed rapidly 
between 1954 and 1958, but, as a result of the decline of the 
technically-oriented Soviet model of enterprise management in 
China and the ascendency of the Communist Party's role in the 
enterprise's policy making and operation, they drastically slowed 
down between 1958 and 1962. From 1962 to 1964, the management 
education progressed again, owing to the governement's re-
emphasis on technical approach to economic development. However, 
at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966,the specialty 
and most of the members of its faculty came under strong attack 
and in 1967 it was the first education program at HIT to be 
officially abolished. By 1970, the majority of its members were 
undergoing ideological reeducation in the countryside. Although 
they returned to HIT by 1972, none vorked in his or her previous 
academic field. It vas only until mid-1978 that the Chinese 
government decided to reestablish management education at HIT. 
[Battat, 1986, 72-74] 
The disregard for managerial eduation before 1978 caused a 
great shortage of managerial experts. In 1979, for instance, 20 
percent of top managers of industrial and transportation 
enterprises in the industrially advanced Liaoning Province had 
had any professional training. In Shanghai, of the 2,000 
production management cadres of 64 key enterprises of the First 
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t Bureau of Electrical Machinery of that municipality, only 16, or 
0.8 percent of the sample, had graduated from higher educational 
institutions. The First Ministry of Machine-Building conducted a 
survey on the former education level of the top leadership of 249 
of it's key enterprises. Among the 2,400 cadres at the 
directorship level, 64.3 percent had an elementary or junior high 
school education, 21.4 percent had a senior high school or 
secondary technical school education, and only the remaining 14.3 
percent had a high level education. Also, the majority of the 
university-trained cadres had technical rather than managerial 
training. [Huan, 1980, 4] 
In 1978, a number of Chinese leaders advocated 
managerial modernization. Fang Yi, the Poliburo's specialist on 
science, for instance, called in March for a plan to deliver 
Chinese technical personnel abroad to study and work, the 
strengthening of cooperation with other countries to learn about 
their scientific and technical research and their experience in 
organization and management, and the invitation of foreign 
experts and advisers to teach and work in China. [Fang, 1978, 13] 
On August 28, an article appeared to justisfy the borrowing of 
foreign scientific management methods: 
"If v e learn to apply them (scientific management methods) 
systematically, they will be conducive to improving our 
work. However, scientific management was once given the 
very unpleasant name
 x




叙 repression1 We don't care what the Gang of Four 
labelled them. Practice has proved that the results of 
introducing things foreign are good and that we have not 
become 、foreign slaves* because of them, Practice is 
the only way to decide whether a name is supported by 
facts." [DAILY REPORT, PRC, 1978, 1-5] 
In October, 1978, Hu Qiaomu went further in his advocacy of 
learning management techniques from capitalist countries, beyond 
simply importing equipment and technical know-how from them. He 
mentioned that "the planned management and other management 
systems within capitalist factories in the early years have now 
been developed into a modern, highly efficient planned management 
and other management systems of the big companies". In his 
opinion, communists had to learn from the "bourgeoisie" and the 
"first-rate capitalist experts", [Hu, 1978, 4] An article ,-
expressing similar view also appeared in the same month. It 
maintained that China, in order to achieve , the Four 
Modernizations, had to study seriously the scientific and 
effective enterprise management of capitalist countries. [Jiang, 
Wang and Jiang, 1978, 14-5] Deng Xiaoping also stated in 1978 
that China had to learn foreign advanced management methods and 
apply them in both the operation of enterprises with newly 
imported technology and equipment and the technical 
transformation of existing enterprises. [Deng, 1984, 161] 
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China's urgent need to draw on managerial experience of 
other countries is easy to understand. A Chinese specialist in 
management once explained why the need was so urgent: 
"the standard of China's present production and technical 
development then was, on the average, 10 to 20 years behind 
Western developed countries. A certain standard of 
production and technical development usually calls for a 
corresponding level of management• If the standard of 
management lags behind that production and technical 
development, it will hinder the development of production 
and technology. Many Chinese enterprises have higher level 
of production and technological development than 
management, hence the need to reform the management." 
[Huang, M.F., 1986, 51] 
In response to the official urge for managerial 
modernization, a number of associations and societies were 
founded in 1978 to promote management education, training and 
research. The Institute of Industrial Economics was established 
to conduct research on China's industrial economic structure and 
management system. Its interest included the study of the 
national enterprise management system from an economic point of 
view, and of the micro-economics of the enterprise. Soon, the 
Institute started to publish the results of its research, 
including a detailed assessment of the management of the Daqing 
Oil Company and a monthly magazine, Jingji Guanli (Economic 
Management), the first issue of which appeared in February 1979. 
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‘This economic and management magazine was intended to popularize 
modern management techniques and methods by presenting in each of 
their issues, articles and examples on the basic applications of 
linear programming, P.E.R.T. and other similar, quantitatively 
oriented management tools. In mid-1978, tvo other important 
management research associations were set up: the Chineses 
Research Association for Modern Management and the Chinese 
Research for Engineering Economics (or Technology Economics). 
Their principal objectives were to facilitate the introduction 
and adaption of foreign managerial theories, techniques and 
expertise to China's needs and environment, to promote the 
development of these foreign managerial knowledge domestically, 
and to popularize their use among Chinese organizations» [Battat, 
1986, 79] The China Enterprise Management Association was also 
planned to be established in 1978, Its aim was to conduct 
executive training programs and conferences, publish and 
circulate professional materials, establish links with 
counterparts abroad, and conduct practical experiments in 
enterprises. Besides the above associations, a lot of 
professional societies, such as the Association of Textile 
Enterprise Management, Society of International' Trade, the 
Systems Engineering Society were planned to be set up in 1978. 
Their purpose was also to promote the understanding and 
application of modern technology and management techniques. These 
societies sponsored confernces, executive training programs, 
publications of books and materials, and so on. [Battat, 1986, 




societies explicitly reflect China's interest in borrowing 
foreign managerial techniques. 
In addition to the above new associations and societies, 
some established organizations started to promote managerial 
education as well. The Ministry of Higher Education attempted to 
raise the level of management education in universities and 
colleges by setting up standards and requirements and supervising 
the educationalal institutions. The various national and local 
governemht organizations, which had their own education 
institutions that trained personnel for their operations, started 
to emphasize management education and they were even more active 
in management education development than the Ministry of 
Education because of their large number and urgent need to train 
their own managerial staff. [Battat, 1986, 82-3] For instance, a 
large industrial ministry organized two new courses, the Computer 
Science Refresher Course and the Systems Engineering Refresher 
Course, at one of the universities it supervised as early as the 
fall of 1978 to train two groups of its employees from across the 
country in computer science and systems engineering for 
management. The ministry also planned to introduce a third 
course, the Syetems Engineerning Teaching Training Course, which 
was scheduled for the spring-summer semester of 1979. This course 
was the first attempt at the long and arduous process of building 
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 government and various associations advocated 
managerial modernization, Chinese industrial enterprises started 
to apply modern managerial methods in 1978. The first method 
adopted was total quality control, which was introduced from 
Japan. In September 1978, the government departments concerned 
conducted the first campaign of "quality month" to encourage the 
use of total quality control. However, since the Chinese 
enterprises had little knowledge of modern managerial skills in 
1978, most of the modern skills, such as value engineering, 
network technique, market research and forecasting, started in 
the following years. 
From the above, it is obvious that the PRC launched its 
first managerial modernization campaign in 1978, In the same 
year, the government initiated several new measures to acquire 
foreign managerial techniques. Studying management books and 
articles written by foreigners and employing foreign experts in 
management teaching, such as Joseph Y. Battat, vere two of them* 
[Battet, 1985, 97] China also started to exchange delegations in 
the field of management with foreign countries. The first 
exchange was planned to take place in 1979, Negotiations with 
foreign governments to make management part of scientific, 
academic and cultural exchange programs with foreign governments 
also began. [Battet, 1985, 98-9] For instance, China and the 
U.S. signed a science and technology agreement after their 
negotiation in 1978; in the following two and a half years, Sino-




including hydropover, earth sciences, and scientific management. 
Sino—American cooperation in the management field resulted in the 
establishment of a joint Sino-American industrial management 
center in Dalian, where American and Chinese management experts 
were working with Chinese enterprise and research managers to 
upgrade China's management system to better accord vith the 
requirements of modern industrial development. [Simon, 1982, 536] 
In addition to the above measures, China decided in 1978 to 
set up Sino-foreign joint ventures, which enabled the Chinese to 
learn managerial skills directly from foreign managers and 
technicans* Dissatisfied with the negligence of market demand, 
laws of value and economic efficiency in Chinese enterprises, Chu 
Baotaif a senior officer in China's Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
believed that the founding of joint venture was an effective way 
to acquire foreign managerial skills, because foreign venturers 
sent managers, technicans and managerial experts to China. [Chu 
and Dong, 1986, 40] China's need for managerial modernization was 
an important factor leading to the founding of Sino-foreign joint 
enterprises. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Deng Xiaoping stated in 
1985 that managerial knowledge was one of the two foremost 
benefits that China could get from Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
[Deng, 1987, 124] A more detailed description of how China 
utilized joint ventures to modernize its industrial enterprise 
management is presented in the following chapter. 
77 
* I 
CHAPTER 4. INTKODUC.TION AND DESIGN OF THE NEW POLICY 
INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW POLICY 
Chapter 3 has revealed that China accepted direct foreign 
investment in December 1978 because of its political changes 
between 1976 and 1978, its increasing emphasis on technology 
importation, the restructuring of its economy, the change in 
Chinese communists' attitude towards foreign powers and its need 
for managerial modernization. However, there was evidence that it 
had already prepared to accept direct foreign investment several 
months before December 1978. 
After Deng Xiaoping had become the first deputy premier in 
charge of the Four Modernizations in March 1978, China started to 
initiate discussions on joint ventures with investment firms and 
representatives of Western corporations. In the case of the 
United States, the subject vas first brought up in a meeting 
between the respective officials of Beijing,
1
 s Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and the National Council for U.S.-China Trade in May 1978 
when they rae七 in Hong Kong. (By the end of that year, with the 
Council's liaison assistance, a number of、：Letters of intent', or 
、protocols,, for joint ventures were signed between China and 
several U.S. firms.) [CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Mar.-Apr., 1979, 
p.15] In Augtist, there were unconfirmed reports that China 
planned to set up Sino-foreign joint ventures plants near 
Guangzhou, probably at Shenzhen. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
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I Aug. 4 and 18, 1978] In September, China discussed the 
possibility of Sino-foreign joint exploitation of its oil fields 
and coal mine with the United States, Japan, Britain and France. 
[DA GONG DAO, Sep. 15, 1978] It also showed interest in 
establishing joint ventures with capitalist countries outside 
China. In August, China Resources, a Beijing-controlled 
commercial distributor in Hong Kong, approached several European, 
American and Japanese firms about the possibility of 50-50 joint 
equity co-production ventures in Hong Kong and Macau, [FAR 
EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Aug.18, 1978] 
Besides discussing the founding of joint ventures vith 
foreign firms, China was also drafting joint venture laws in 
about mid-1978. In September, a Hong Kong lawyer, Liao Yaozhu, 
was invited to Beijing to help the Chinese officials draft the 
laws by giving advice on international commercial laws. [XIN BAO 
MAGAZINE, Aug, 1979, 8] According to Peter Nehemkis and Alexis 
Nehemkis [1980, 37], China's joint venture lav promulgated in 
1979 was drafted by legal specialists of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science, with the assistance of British-trained Hong Kong 
lawyers and American legal technicans. 
In August, articles favouring utilization of direct foreign 
investment appeared in China. Hu Qiaomu, for instance, praised 
the Soviet absorption of direct foreign investment. He 
appreciated the various measures adopted by Lenin and Stalin to 
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expedite Soviet economic development. These measures included the 
acquisition of foreign capital through loans, the importation of 
large quantities of. machinery and associated equipment, the 
signing of contracts for foreign technical assistance, the hiring 
of foreign technicians and experts, the sending of people for 
education abroad and the founding of Soviet-foreign joint 
ventures. He especially emphasized the excellence of such 
measures as the organization of Soviet-foreign joint companies 
and the granting of leases and concessions to foreign partners 
(specifically for the development of oil exploration and 
exploitation and mining). [DAILY REPORT, PRC, Aug.25, 1978] Deng 
Xiaoping also talked about utilization of direct foreign 
investment in September and December. On September 16, 1978, in 
his remarks on hearing a work report by the members of the 
Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, he mentioned that he had contemplated 
undertaking joint ventures before Mao Zedong's death in September 
1976. [Deng, 1984, 142] On December 13, 1978, in his speech at 
the closing session of Central Working Conference, he stressed 
that China had to concentrate on writing lavs, including the one 
on investment by foreigners. [Deng, 1984, 158] 
From the above, it is quite clear that China had prepared to 
utilize direct foreign investment several months before Li 
Qiang's formal announcement of China's acceptance of direct 
foreign investment on December 15, 1978. [JINGJI MOBAO, Jan.l, 
1979] After Li's declaration, numerous foreign investors 
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immediately showed great interest in investing directly in China. 
.* 
For instance, Harbour International Limited Company, an American 
company, quickly signed an agreement with two Chinese 
enterprises located in Guangzhou on February 6f 1979 to set up a、 
joint venture at Shenzhen. [JINGJI DAOBAO, May 16, 1979, 7] 
However, many foreigners hesitated to invest in early 1979 as the 
details of China's new policy had not yet be announced. Thus, 
China's urgent task in 1979 was to design and announce the 
content of the nev policy^ 
To design a nev policy concerning direct' foreign investment 
was an extremely arduous task. For the first twenty-nine years 
of its existence, the PRC had no experience in having nationals 
of capitalist states to establish joint ventures or other forms 
of direct foreign investment in China. Its experience learnt from 
the founding of several joint ventures with its socialist friends 
- - t h e Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Albania — was 
not relevant as these foreign partners were not private 
investors. For this reason, China started in 1978 to study how 
the Soviet Union, Yogoslavia and Rumania utilized direct foreign 
investment. [Wang, Q., 1919, 30-5 and Ji, 1979, 26-31] To a 
certain extent, the Eastern European models offered China some 
hints on hov to readjust its planned economy when utilizing 
direct foreign investment and how to create an attractive 
investment environment. Howeverr the task remained uneasy as the 
designers could not just copy the models. Nonetheless, with the 




Venture (the Joint Venture Law of 1979), the announcement of 
establishing special economic zones and the acceptance of wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises； the new policy had taken shape by J u l y 
1979. 
The Joint Venture Law of 1979 contained China's basic 
regulations governing Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, 
protecting the rights of Chinese and foreign investors. Before 
the promulgation of this law, China had studied the experience of 
Eastern European countries• [Halpern, 1985, 93] However, as its 
legal framework was still incomplete after the promulgation, 
China urged foreigners to fil l the gaps through the contracts 
until a more adequate framework emerged. On the other hand, it 
continued to strive hard to improve its foreign investment legal 
system. A number of academic and governmental bodies studied the 
legal and operational aspects of transnational joint enterprises. 
Among these were the Institute of World Economy of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science and the International Trade Research 
Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, China also sought to 
learn more about the regulations of direct foreign investment 
through the help of international organizations such as the 
United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations and the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Eventually, a 
number of lavs concerning direct foreign investment were writted 
and passed, such as Procedures of the PRC for the Registration 
and Administration of Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture (Jul.26, 
1980), the Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Chinese-Foreign 
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Joint Ventures (Sep.10, 1980), the Income Tax Law of the PRC 
Concerning Foreign Enterprises (Dec.13, 1981)f Regulations for 
the Implementaton of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures 
(Sep.20, 1983), and many others. 
In addition to the Joint Venture Lav of 1979, China 
announced in July 1979 the establishment of special economic 
zones in two southern provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, to attract 
foreign investment and promote foreign trade. To a certain 
extent, these zones were the progeny of the export commodity 
production bases that Zhou Enlai promoted as early as 1960 and 
that the Ministry of Foreign Trade finally established between 
1971 and 1972. These export bases provided close coordination 
among local foreign trade bureaus, offices of the central foreign 
trade corporations, and agricultural and industrial production 
teams for the purpose of bolstering export of particular 
products. [Pattison, no,3, 1981, 162-3] However, the special 
economic zones played a much more important role. In Deng 
Xiaoping's words on February 24, 1984r "a special economic zone 
is a medium for introducing technology, management and knowledge, 
It is also a vindov for our foreign policy." [Dengf 1987, 44] 
After 1979, the four special economic zones, especially Shenzhen, 
quickly developed into the centres for direct foreign investment 
because of their geographical closeness to Hong Kong and the 
presence of special and preferential policies, such as tax 
reduction, [Jao, 1983, 49-53] 
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The last major announcement concerning direct foreign 
investment made in mid-1979 was the acceptance of wholly foreign-
owned enterprises. In January 1979, according to some Beijing 
officials, the maximum contribution of the investment made by 、 
foreigner(s) in a Sino-foreign joint venture was 49 percent. 
[JINGJI DAOBAO, Jan. 24, 1979] This means that no wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises would be accepted. However, in June, 
Deng Xiaoping told the Japanese Justice Minister, Yoshimi Furui, 
that Beijing would permit foreigners under certain conditions to 
set up wholly foreign-owned subsidaries• On July 1, China passed 
the Joint Venture Lav of 1979, which did not set the upper limit 
of contribution. [CFELr 1982, 2] In mid-July, Li Xianlian added 
that China would accept a limited number of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. [JINGJI DAOBAO, Jul. 25, 1979, 3] The acceptance of 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises indicates China's intention of 
providing multiple forms of direct foreign investment to attract 
different investors. According to Yu Guangyuan, a Chinese 
economist r a total of four forms of direct foreign investment 
were accepted by the PRC, [1984, 699-701] Their characteristics 
and development in 1979 and the early 1980s are briefly described 
respectively as follows: 
* China's statistical departments have a broader definition of 
direct foreign investment. By their definition, compensation 
trade and export processing are also forms of direct foreign 
investment. However, t;hey should not be considered as forms of 
direct foreign investment between 1977 and 1978, because 
foreigners did not participate in the management of the Chinese 




(a) Equity joint venture: 
Capital of an equity joint venture is derived from pooling 
of funds by both Chinese and foreign investors who together run 
the enterprise in the form of a limited company and assume 
responsibility for both profit and loss. The enterprise itself is 
a legal entity. The profits are divided in proportion to their 
equity shares. According to the Joint Venture Law of 1979, the 
minimum share of foreign participants should in general be not 
less than 25 per cent but there is no maximum specified. After 
the period of cooperation as stipulated in the contract, the 
enterprise will be reverted to China, 
Equity joint venture was the first choice of Beijing 
officials who desired to import advanced technology and 
management knov-how* The first law concerning direct foreign 
investment, passed in China was the Joint Venture Law of 1979. 
However, this form developed slowly in 1979 and the early 1980s 
because of the lack of a complete legal structure and tax 
regulations in China. By the end of 1980, only 20 equity joint 
ventures had been approved by the Chinese government, with a 
total investment of over U.S. $210 million. In 1981, the number 
of new equity joint ventures was just 19, involving $20 million 
of foreign investment and, in 1982, only 8 new agreements were 
signed. However, by the close of 1983, much of the legal 
framework had solidified and the grovth of foreign confidence in 
the permanency of China's new policy led to a rapid expansion in 




(b) Contractual joint venture; 
It is an enterprise run jointly by a foreign firm that 
provides equipment, capital, industrial property right and 
technical know-how, and by a Chinese firm vhich provides land, 
factory buildings and labour services. From a legal point of 
view, the contractual joint venture is not a new, independent 
entity and is not governed by the corporation law, whilst the 
liabilities, rights and obligations of both parties are 
stipulated in the agreements and contracts signed by them, with 
some cases that the Chinese firm bears no liabilities at all. The 
proportions of distribution of productsr revenues or profits are 
shared according to the terms of cooperation. Upon the expiretion 
of the contract, the technology and equipment will become the 
property of China. 
This type of joint, venture developed faster than equity 
joint venture. By the end of 1980, more than 300 enterprises had 
been approved. The projects drew upon foreign investment 
totalling about U.S. $500 million. These enterprises were 
located, for the most part, in Guangdong and Fujian provinces 
and the majority of the investors came from Hong Kong and Macau. 
In 1981, 127 additional ones were approved, with foreign 
investment of $1.2 billion. [Ji, C.W" 1981, 16] The beauty of 
this form is that it is more flexible and virtually everything is 
negotiable. [Stepanek, 1982, 21] For instance, the Chinese party 
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may entrust the foreign party to take complete charge of the 
management of the co-operative joint venture in its daily 
economic activities. In this case the enterprise is similar to 
the wholly foreign-cmied enterprise, which is managed solely by 
the foreign party, [Zhou, Z.Y., 1988, 117] 
(c) Co-operative exploration for offshore oil: 
In the agreements for co-operative exploration for offshore 
oil, investments are jointly made and "when commercial 
production begins, apart from operational fees, a certain 
proportion of the output will be set aside for China; the 
remainder will go toward repaying both parties' investments plus 
interest and a certain profit for the foreign companies." [Ji, 
C.W., 1981, 16] Most of the offshore oil exploration and 
exploitation contracts are in the form of contractual joint 
venture, but are regulated by a different set of laws, such as 
Regulations of the PRC on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum 
Resource in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprise (Nov.12, 1982). 
[Chu, D.Y., 1985, 3] 
As oil explorations are large projects, only a few 
agreements were made in 1979 and the early 1980s. These included 
the contracts with the Japan National Oil Company and the 
National Elf Aquitine of France for joint exploration in the 
Bohai Sea and the contract with the Compagnie Francaise des 
Petroles for joint exploration in the Beibu Gulf of the South 
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China Sea. [Yu, 1984, 701] 
(d) Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
It is also known as sole proprietorship, in which a 
subsidiary of the foreign partner is incorporated under the lavs 
and regulations of China and is 100 percent wholly owned by the 
foreign partner for a defined period. The investor has to be 
responsible for all the capital and equipment inputs, the 
marketing of its outputs and the running of the enterprise. 
Profits within the defined period of operation could be remitted 
overseas after tax. After the defined period, the liquid asset 
and the unsold products are subject to investor's own disposal, 
but the fixed asset should be reverted to China without 
compensation» 
As mentioned before, Li Xianlian stated in mid-1979 that 
China would accept only a small number of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. It is thus not a surprise that the development of 
this form of enterprises was extremely slow. Up to the end of 
1984, just about 70 wholly foreign-owned enterprises had been 
approved. Thus, those Chinese who favoured this kind of business 
activity had to spend more effort in explaining its advantages 
to the Chinese government. [Zheng, Y.E., 1985, 18] 
The above description has shown that, with the promulgation 
b f t h e Law of the PRC on Chinese-foreign Joint Venture (the Joint 
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• Venture Law of 1979), the announcement of establishing special 
economic zones and the acceptance of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, China's new policy concerning direct foreign 
investment was clear in late 1979. In the following, we will 
examine how the new policy was utilized as an economic 
development strategy to promote technolgoy acquisition and 
managerial modernization, and to raise investment, export, 
employment and revenue. The major constraints on the policy's 
design will also be discussed, 
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISTION 
As discussed in Chapter 3, importation of advanced 
technology was a major factor contributing to China's acceptance 
of direct foreign investment in 1978, Thus, China invited foreign 
investors to make investments in patent and proprietary 
technologies. According to Article 5 of the Joint Venture Law of 
1979, "each party to a joint venture may make its investment in 
cash, in kind or in industrial property rights, etc." [CFEL, 
vol.1, 1982, 2] Industrial property rights included patent 
technology and trademark. [Chu, B.T., 1988, 67] In 1983, China 
added that foreigners could also invest in proprietary 
technology. As this mode of investment enabled China to import 
foreign technology without paying money, it was greatly 
encouraged by the government. Between 1979 and 1987, while most 
of other countries allowed foreigners to use proprietary 
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technology as a form of investment equivalent to fifteen percent 
of the total investment, [Chu, B.T., 1988, 101] China accepted 
twenty percent. [CFEL, vol.3, 1987, 11] China also started to 
protect the industrial property rights of foreign venturers. For 
instance, the United States-China Trade Agreement was signed on 
July 7, 1979 to give patent protection. On March 12, 1984, China 
published and adopted its first Patent Lav. [CFEL, vol.3t 1987, 
187-205] 
In order to absorb foreign technology, China welcomed 
foreign investors capable of offering advanced technology. In 
China, foreign investors needed the approvals of the Chinese 
government to start business [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 2] and, in 
general, those proposals which involved advanced technology would 
easily be approved. In 1983, after four years' utilization of 
direct foreign investment, China formally stated that a joint 
venture that applied for establishment should satisfy one or more 
of the following requirements: 
(1) it will adopt advanced technology and equipment and 
scientific managerial techniques, enabling it to 
increase the variety of its products, improve their 
quality and raise output, and conserve energy and 
materials; 
,(2) it will benefit the technical renovation of the venture, 




⑶ it will be able to expand the export of its products and 
increase foreign exchange earnings; and 
⑷ it will be able to train technical and managerial 
personnel." [CFELf vol.3, 1987, 2] 
These indicate that China preferred those foreign investors vho 
could supply advanced technology or promote technical renovation. 
China paid serious attention to the quality of technology 
introduced through Sino-foreign enterprises. The Joint Venture 
Law of 1979 required that "the technology and the equipment that 
serve as a foreign joint venturer's investement must be advanced 
technology and equipment that actually suit our country's needs". 
[CFEL, voLl, 1982, 2] These dual requirements sometimes could 
not easily be met, as they might be contradictory at times, and 
so the partners had to come to a clear understanding in the 
agreement. [Jaslow,, 1983, 246] Nonetheless, the foreigners were 
expected to try their best to meet these requirements. China's 
joint venture laws also provided penalties and rewards concerning 
the transfer of technology. [Jaslov, 1983, 246] "If the foreign 
joint venturer causes losses by deception through the intentional 
use of backward technology and equipment, it shall pay 
compensation for the losses." [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 2-3] In 
contrast, "a joint venture that possesses advanced technology by 
world standards may apply for a reduction of or exemption from 
income tax for the first two to three profit-making years", 
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[CFEL, vol,l, 1982, 4] Finally, in order to prevent fraud, China 
required in 1983 that the machinery, equipment or other 
materials, industrial property rights, or proprietary technology 
contributed as investment by a foreign venturer should be 
examined by the department in charge of Chinese venturer and 
that the foreign venturer vho contributed investment iri the form 
of industrial property rights or proprietary technology had to 
submit "copies of patent , certificates information 
concerning their validity and special technical characteristics". 
[CFEL, vol,3, 1987, 12-13] 
The above regulations and practice clearly reveal that the 
new policy was designed to facilitate the importation of advanced 
technology. 
MANAGERIAL MODERNIZATION 
China's new policy concerning direct foreign investment was 
also designed to promote managerial modernization. In order to 
achieve optimal managerial learning, China preferred joint 
ventures to wholly foreign-owned enterprises, stressed the 
participation of Chinese venturers in the management level of 
joint ventures, welcomed the coming of foreign managers and the 
setting up of managerial training programmes, and spread 




China placed great emphasis on learning modern managerial 
skills through Sino-foreign joint venture, since the Sino-foreign 
joint management of the enterprises offered the Chinese partner 
great opportunities to learn practical managerial knowledge 
directly from the foreign partner. In contrast, no such benefit 
was found in a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, in which 
foreigners operated the enterprise themselves. This partly 
explained why only a limited number of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise has been approved by the PRC. 
In order to ensure that the Chinese venturers learnt 
managerial techniques, Chinese laws required the participation of 
Chinese venturers in the management level of Sino-foreign joint 
ventures. According to Article 6 of the Joint Venture Lav of 
1979, the major decision body within a joint venture vas the 
board of directors, which was empowered "to discuss and decide 
all major problems of the venture: expansion programmes, 
proposals for production and operating activities, the budget for 
revenues and expenditures, distribution of profits, plans 
concerning manpower and pay scales, the termination of business 
and the appointment or employment of the president, the vice-
president (s) , the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, 
as well as their powers and terms of employment, etc." [CFEL, 
vol
!
. 1, 1982, 3-4] In order to learn how to make such major 
decisions and to protect the interest of the Chinese investors, 
the Joint Venture Law of 1979 required that "the board of 
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. directors shall have a chairman, whose office shall be assumed by 
the Chinese joint venturer (s) r and one or two vice-chairtnen, 
whose office(s) shall be assumed by the foreign joint 
venturer(s)", [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 3] China's participation in the 
management of Sino-foreign joint venture was thus assured• The 
Law also confirmed China's participation in routine management by-
stating that "the offices of president and vice-president(s) (or 
factory manager and deputy manager(s)) shall be assumed by the 
respective parties to the venture". [CFEL, vol.1, 1882, 4] In 
practice, China expected each member of a Western joint venture 
cadre to train his or her ovn replacement. Thus, in a typical 
joint venture set up after 1978, for each foreign manager, there 
was a Chinese deputy manager; in many firms, the relationship 
between the two vas that of mentor to protege." "Each one teaches 
one" was not merely a pedagogical slogan, but an important 
vehicle for the creation of an indigenous management and 
professional work force. [Bovarnick, 1988, 236] 
Foreign managers were welcome to work in Sino-foreign joint 
ventures. No restriction on the employment of expatriates in 
joint ventures was set. Wages, salaries and other legitimate 
N
 income earned by the foreign staff and workers of a joint 
venture, after payment of the individual income tax under the tax 
laws of the PRC, could be remitted abroad through the Bank of 
China in accordance with the foreign exchange regulations. [CFEL, 
vol.1, 1982, 6] 
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China also welcomed the setting up of managerial training 
programmes for the Chinese by the foreign partners. The 
Provisions of the PRC for Labour Management in Chinese-foreign 
Joint Ventures, promulgated by the State Council on July 26, 
1980, contained a clause; "joint ventures may establish skilled 
workers' schools and training courses for the training of 
managerial personnel and skilled workers", [CFEL, vol.lr 1982, 
21] 
The aim of China's new policy concerning direct foreign 
investment was not only to educate the Chinese director and 
managers within Sino-foreign joint ventures, but also to spread 
modern managerial skills to other Chinese as veil. Managers, 
officials and scholars from all over China were sent to visit 
special economic zones like Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where there were 
high concentration of Sino-foreign joint ventures, to study the 
experiences and achievements of the joint ventures at first hand. 
Managers from Shenzhen and Zhuhai joint ventures were sent on 
lecture tours within China to inform domestic enterprises about 
the operation of personnel practice and incentive schemes; they 
also served as management consultants to advise state-owned firms 
within China on the implementation of managerial reform. In the 
Special Economic Zones, domestic joint ventues were actively 
encouraged and became a significant aspect of Shenzhen's 
development in 1983 and 1984. They were co-operative undertakings 
between local companies and enterprises from other parts of 
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China, sometimes with a foreign investor as well. This kind of 
arrangement effectively relayed managerial reform experience to 
the internal partners* [Shurn and Sigel, 1986, 223-4] Finally, 
magazines and newspapers on modern managerial skills gained from 
Sino-foreign joint ventures had a great contribution to China's 
managerial modernization. Since 1979, the Chinese have been 
making a major effort to spread western modern managerial 
knowledge in China by publishing Chinese management magazines 
like Economic Management (Jingji Guanli) and Introduction 
(Yinjin). At Shenzhen, some newspapers like Shenzhen Special Zone 
Post (Shenzhen Tequ Bao) also contain news and articles 
concerning the management of Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
INCREASE OF INVESTMENT, EXPORT, EMPLOYMENT, AND REVENUE 
The above discussion has shown that the new policy was 
designed to absorb foreign advanced technology and managerial 
skills. However, the designers of the new policy were quite 
ambitious. They desired to maximize the benefits of direct 
foreign investment. In order to expedite China's economic 
development, they intended to .develop China
1
s industries by 
utilizing foreign capital and to raise China's export, employment 
and government revenue. 
Besides the lack of technology and managerial techniques, 
capital shortage hindered China's industrial development. Between 
1949 and 1978, China relied mainly on domestic accumulation of 
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t capital and, for capital shortage, concentrated on the 
development of heavy industry. The proportion of heavy industry 
investment in total investment was 46.5%, 57.5% and 54.8% in the 
first, third and fourth five-year plan respectively. In 1978, it 
was 55.7%. In contrast, light indust^y< agriculture and tertiary 
industries were seriously neglected. The proportion of light 
industry investment in total investment was only 5.9%# 4.0% and 
5.4% in the first, third and fourth five-year plan respectively 
and in 1978, it was still only 5.7%. [Li, X.N., 1987, 65-6] It 
was only until the late 1978 that the priority of development 
changed from "heavy, light, agriculture' to 'agriculture, light, 
heavy'. [Liu, G.G" 1984, 145] In 1979, Li Xian-nian stated that 
China had to have a balance development of agriculture, light and 
heavy industries. [Li, X.N., 1987 f 75-6] Simultaneously, 
measures vere taken to develop tertiary industry. [Liu, G.J., 
1989, 97] In consequence, more investments were required. Direct 
foreign investment was thus utilized as a substitute of domestic 
capital to develop China's light and tertiary industries. 
According to the Joint Venture Law of 1979, foreign investors 
were allowed to contribute 25%, up to 100%, of the total 
investment to an enterprise. [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 2] The absence 
of the upper limit of the proportion enabled China to absorb more 
foreign capital, while the presence of the lower limit ensured 
that foreign venturers paid attention to the business of the 
“joint ventures that they had invested. [Chu and Dong, 1986, 69] 
In addition, foreign investors were invited to invest in various 
industries. The hotel industry was opened to them in mid-1979. 
97 
渗 \ 
During the following years, most direct foreign investment were 
founded in light industry and the hotel industry, in which many 
investors achieved quick results and earned large profits with a 
relatively small investment. This development undoubtedly 
expedited the development of China's light and tertiary 
industries. In 1983, China's additional lavs for equity joint 
venture recommended foreigners to invest in the following 
industries: 
(1) energy resources development, and the construction materials, 
chemical and metallurgical industries; 
(2) the machine-building, instrument and meter industries, and 
offshore oil-mining equipment manufacturing; 
(3) electronic .industry, computer industry and communications 
equipment manufacturing; 
(4) light industries, and the textile, food, pharmaceutical, 
medical apparatus and instruments and packaging industries; 
(5) agriculture, animal husbandry and acquaculture; and 
(6) tourism and service trades. [CFEL, vol.3, 1987, 1-2] 
These recommendations indicate that China intended to use foreign 
capital to develop its light industry, agriculture and tertiary 
industry. 
Direct foreign investment was also a means to increase 




• long time, China lacked competitive power in its industrial 
export. [Li, X.N., 1987, 66] To a large extent, direct foreign 
investment could raise China's productivity, as foreign investors 
supplied advanced technology and managerial skills. In addition, 
foreign venturers' familiarity with overseas markets could raise 
China's export ability. Thus, China expected Sino-foreign joint 
ventures to be export-oriented• The Joint Venture Law of 1979 
clearly stated that "a joint venture is encouraged to market its 
products outside China. Export products may be distributed to 
foreign markets through the joint venture directly or through 
associated agencies, and they may also be distributed through 
China's foreign trade agencies." [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 5] 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the creation of a joint 
venture would probably be approved if it was "able to expand the 
export of its products and increase foreign exchange earnings". 
Direct foreign investment was also used to alleviate China's 
serious unemployment problem. In early 1979, the total number 
of urban youths waiting for jobs amounted to 15 million, 
accounting for 12.6 per cent of the total workforce at that time. 
As the Chinese government thought that it was a pressing social 
problem and had to be solved immediately to avoid distructive 
impact on stability, [Li, X.N., 1987, 7-8] several remedial 
measures were taken in 1979. [Zhao and Lu, 1986, 125] 
Coincidentally, the new policy concerning direct foreign 
investment was adopted. As the establishment of enterprises vith 
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direct foreign investment could offer nev jobs, the new policy 
was utilized as one of the job-creating' devices. Generally 
speaking, this device was very powerful, as every new joint 
venture recruited several hundreds or thousands workers. [Chu and 
Dong, 1986, 44] For instance, three equity joint ventures, 
Tianshan Woollen Textile Company, China-Schindler Elevator 
Company and Fujian Hitachi TV Limited employed a total of 4,000 
workers in 1981. [CHINA NEWSLETTER, Jan-Feb, 1982, 20] According 
to Article 8 of the Provisions of the PRC for Labour Management 
in Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures promulgated on July 26, 1980, 
"the wages levels of the staff and workers of joint ventures 
shall be fixed at 120 or 150 per cent of the real wages of the 
staff and workers of state enterprises in the locality in the 
same line of business[CFEL, 1982, 22] This attracted Sino-
foreign joint ventures to employ Chinese workers. 
Taxing the joint ventures and whoily-owned foreign 
enterprises could increase China's government revenue and provide 
the government with more funds to develop its economy. In 1980> 
China formally announced its taxation policy concerning joint 
ventures: "the income tax rate on joint venture shall be 30%. In 
addition, a local income tax of 10% of the assessed income tax 
shall be levied. When a foreign venturer remits abroad its share 
of profit obtained from the venture, an income tax of 10% of the 
remitted amount shall be levied".[CFEL, vol—1, 1982, 36] China's 
income tax law concerning wholly foreign-owned enterprises was 
also promulgated in 1981. The income tax should be computed at 
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t progressive rates on amounts in excess of specified amounts of 
taxable at specified tax rates, which were between 20% and 40%. 
[CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 64-5] However, it is important to notice 
that the designers of the nev policy did not consider government 
revenue as an important, issus. As Deng Xiaoping put it, the state 
could collect taxes on the joint ventures, but "an even more 
important aspect of joint venture is that from them we can learn 
managerial skills and advanced technology that will help us to 
develop our socialist economy". [Deng, 1987, 124] For the sake 
of acquiring managerial skills and advanced technology, China was 
villing to reduce its tax rates. For instance, it proclaimed in 
1979 that a joint venture with advanced technology by vorld 
standards was exempted from income tax for the first two to three 
.profit-making years. In October, 1986, it further announced a 
large-scale tax reduction to attract foreigners investors. [Chu, 
B.T., 1988, 139-140] • 
SOME CONSTRAINTS ON THE NEW POLICY'S DESIGN 
The above discussion has clearly demonstrated that the new 
policy was designed as an economic development strategy. However, 
when China tried its best to acquire technology and managerial 
skills and to increase investment, export, employment and 
revenue, it encountered some constraints. In the following, we 
will examine several major ones. 
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The first constraint was China's determination to keep to 
the socialist road. Soon after the acceptance of direct foreign 
investment, Deng Xiaoping declared on March 30, 1979 that "we 
must keep to the socialist road we have always followed 
the principles of socialist public ownership and distribution 
according to work the socialist economy is based on public 
ownership". [Deng, 1984, 172-5] Thus, direct foreign investment 
played only a supplementary role in the socialist economy. Deng 
expressed this veiw clearly in 1980: "No matter to what degree 
we admit foreign, relative magnitude will be 
small and it ,, can't, affect our system of socialist public 
ownership of the means of production. Absorbing foreign capital 
and technology ,.. can only play a complementary role to our 
effect to develop the socialist productive forces." [Deng, 1984, 
332] He mentioned in 1985 again that "we….encourage foreign 
enterprises to establish factories in China. All that will serve 
as a supplement to the socialist economy based on public 
ownership; it cannot and will not. undermine it". [Deng, 1987, 
123] For Ideological reason, the scale of the utilization of 
direct foreign investment was compressed. As China maintained a 
socialist economy, the restructuring of China's economic system, 
which started in 1978, was in small-scale. In the 1980s, China's 
economy remained quite centralized. For the implementation of 
state plans, the Chinese government expected the enterprises with 
direct foreign investment to follow its policies, principles and 
guildness in business activities. Some Chinese economists 
encouraged the government to bring self-started projects or joint. 
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ventures outside the state plan into the planning orbit as much 
as possible. [Yeh, 1981, 11-14] In contrast, foreign investors 
favoured autonomy and requested a reduction of mandatory plans. 
[BEIJING REVIEW, Nov.17, 1986, 19] In short, direct foreign 
investment, could play only a small role in China's socialist 
economy. 
Another constraint, which vas closely related to China's 
determination to keep to the socialist road, was the Chinese 
negative attitude towards capitalism and direct foreign 
investment, Although the Chinese government stated that the 
nature of enterprises with direct foreign investment was state 
capitalism and would not harm its sovereignty, [Chen, G.L., 1985, 
3], foreign capital was still regarded as capitalistic. (Some 
Chinese described Sino-foreign joint venture as a combination of 
socialism and capitalism, [Chu, B,T,, 1983, 19]) Xu Dixin, [1985, 
15-16] a famous Chinese economist, still regarded direct foreign 
investment as a source of exploitation. He stated that "no matter 
it is compensation trade, joint venture or wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise, ve are inevitably exploited ... Foreign capitalists 
gain surplus value with their capital, so we of course will 
suffer from exploitation ....We should admit exploitation and, 
after economic growth, ve will no more be exploited." Some 
Chinese believed that the acceptance of capitalists, surplus 
capital might save capitalism from declining and thus benefitted 
capitalist countries. Some Chinese were reluctant to improve the 
efficiency of Sino-foreign jbint ventures, because they thought 
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that such an improvement would prosper foreign capitalists with 
Chinese money. [Caif 1986, 5] Among the various forms of direct 
foreign investment, wholly foreign一ovned enterprise vas the most 
sensitive issue. To some Chinese, the establishment of such 
enterprises meant a return to capitalism. This partly accounted 
for China's unwillingness to promote the development of wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. Thus, the creation of these 
enterprises was approved only when they met China's stringent 
requirements. According to Article 3 of the PRC Foreign 
Enterprise Law (1986), these enterprises had to be "conducive to 
the development of China
1
s national economy" and had to "use 
technology and equipment or market all or most of their products 
outside China". 
Self-reliance strategy was also a constraint. Despite its 
acceptance of direct foreign investment after 1978, China did not 
rely too heavily on direct foreign investment. Deng Xiaoping 
stated in March 1979 that "we have always followed the policy of 
developing socialist economic construction mainly through self-
reliance -- supplemented by foreign aid." [Deng, 1984, 173-5] 
Thus, China's construction funds still came mainly from its 
domestic accumulation. A Chinese economist stressed that "we must 
rely mainly upon ourselves, primarily on our own industrial 
foundation, technical force and domestic market to achieve the 
goal of the Four Modernizations while seeking all favourable 
external assistance possible". [Jir C.W., 1981, 17] 
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* Nationalism also affected the design of the new policy. 
After the adoption of the new policy, China still emphasized 
nationalism. According to the Joint Venture Lav of 1979, the 
establishment of joint ventures had to be in accordance with the 
principle of equality. [CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 1] The Chinese 
communists viewed this principle as a revolt of the developing 
countries against the traditional international economic relation 
in which investments were made for the purpose of exploiting and 
plundering other countries. [Zhong, 1986, 120] This was a 
reflection of China's economic nationalism. The Regulations for 
the Implementation of the Joint Venture Law of 1984 added that 
China would not accept a proposed joint venture which would 
involve "injury to China's sovereignty". [CFEL, vol.3, 1987, 2] 
This sovereignty principle was neither an abstract concept nor a 
political.slogan; rather it was a concrete and substantive legal 
principle. The. Chinese government controlled, supervised and 
managed every foreign investment project within its territory. 
For example, the state prohibited foreign capital from entering 
certain sectors such as the national defense industry and decided 
whether or not a foreign investment project should be approved. 
[Zhong, 1986, 120] Also, the Joint Venture Lav of 1983 required 
the foreigners not to violate China's law, not to work against 
the requirements of China
1
s national economic development and not 
to create environmental pollution. [CFEL, vol.3, 1987,2] This 
sovereignty principle vas obviously an expression of political 
nationalism. The Chinese government also tried to control Sino-
foreign enterprises as strictly as it could, because it thought 
105 
•• » 
that "if part of the managerial power is lost, the development of 
China's national industries may be affected and the foreigner may 
control some of China's major economic activities." [Wang, Y.B., 
Mar, 1987, 11] Some Chinese believed that a Sino-foreign joint 
venture would operate for the interest of the state if the 
Chinese partner of the joint venture succeeded in controlling 
both the Board of Directors and the operation level of 
management. [Zeng and Li, 1982, 12] For this consideration, the 
Joint Venture Law of 1979 required that the chairman of the joint 
venture had to be assumed by the Chinese joint venturer (China 
did not remove this restriction until April 1990) and that the 
board of directors should reach a decision through consultation. 
[CFEL, vol.1, 1982, 3] This ran contrary to general international 
practices and so, to a certain degree, weakened the 
attractiveness of China's investment environment. 
Furthermore, because of nationalism, China did not promised 
the foreign investors that enterprises with direct foreign 
investment would not be nationalized. Article 2 of the Joint 
Venture Law of 1979 simply provided that "the Chinese Governments 
protects, in accordance with the law, the investment of foreign 
joint ventures, the profits due them and their lawful rights and 
interests in a joint venture•“[CFEL, no.l, 1982, 1] This 
provision fell short of strict statutory guarantee and did not 
have the strength of a constitutional guarantee for foreign 
investment. [Pattison, 1981, 114] The rights of a foreign 
investor might be deprived of by subsequent laws or other 
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enactment. Also, the Law of the PRC on Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises stipulated that the state might expropriate wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises under special circumstances, for the 
public interest, by due process of law and with reasonable 
compensation being given. [Chen, A., 1988, 39] Finally, in order 
to safeguard its national sovereignty, China limited the 
proportion of direct foreign investment in its economy. A Chinese 
scholar confidently stated that China's utilization of direct 
foreign investment would not lead to the domination of China's 
economy by foreign powers, because the proportion of direct 
foreign investment was small. He pointed out that, between 1979 
and 1983f the total fixed capital investment of China's state 
enterprises was 3,910 billion U»S. dollars, while foreign 
investment introduced vas only 146 billion U.S. dollars, [Jiang, 
J.P., 1986, 72] 
China encountered some constraints when it tried to import 
advanced technology and. managerial techniques through the 
utilization of direct foreign investment. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, the vendors of technologies were reluctant to expose their 
most advanced technologies. Thusf many of the machinery and 
equipment supplied by the foreign partners in 1979 and the early 
1980s were in fact not advanced. [Chu and Dong, 86, 59] Some 
Chinese officials thus suggested that the details of the content 
of the foreign technologies had to be included in joint venture 
contracts. [Wang Y.Pr 1987, 21] Unfortunately, the Chinese 
government further discovered that some advanced countries had 
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decided to keep a technological gap between them and China. [Yang 
and Lu, 1986, 85] China's inability to assimilate foreign 
technology was another serious constraint. According to D. F. 
Simon, [1982, 515] China's ability was severely constrained by 
four factors: (1) uneven performance with respect to translating 
research results into the serial production process; (2) poor 
management capabilities, particularly in such areas as project 
integration and industrial organization; (3) technical 
backwardness particularly in precision instrumentation and 
testing equipment; and (4) insufficient numbers of qualified 
science and technology personnel to assist with the management 
and adaptation of imported technology. These greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of China's new policy concerning direct foreign 
investment, China also had difficulties in spreading the 
technology acquired through joint production. Most Sino-foreign 
production cooperation agreements set tight limitations for the 
transfer of high technology to China. Specifically, the Chinese 
partner could not share the acquired technological information 
with other enterprises on Chinese territory. In the event of 
leasing complete technological lines to the Chinese, it was not 
allowed to use them for any other purposes, except those 
stipulated in the contract. When the latter expired, the foreign 
partner had the right to remove the equipment which belonged to 
him. As a result, this form of cooperation significantly 
restricted the area of technological progress, confining it to 
the enterprise which had signed the cooperation agreement. 
[Manezhev, 1985, 42] 
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In managerial learning, the major problems that China faced 
vere the high cost of employing foreign managers and the 
reluctancy of foreign managers to work in China. The cost of 
employing foreign managers in China was very high. According to a 
survey, if the total pay and benefits expense of a U.S.-based 
manager amounted to $80f000r the total support cost in China 
might be as much as three to four times that amount, depending 
primarily pn the employer's policies regarding overseas and 
hardship premiums and the assumption of • increased living 
expenses. [Bovarnick, 1988, 235] Also, foreign managers were 
unwilling to stay in China for other reasons, such as inadequate 
housing and limited educational facilities for their children. 
[Chiang, 1983, 26-9] In a survey conducted at Shenzhen in 1985, 
it was found that the proportion of foreign managers in joint 
ventures was very small; in 75 per cent of the enterprises 
studied, the proportion of foreign managers was just a tenth. 
[Nyaw and Lin, 1986, 183] Finally, the designers of the new 
policy had placed too much confidence on learning through Sino-
foreign joint management. As stated by Kelvin Tarn, deputy general 
manager of Shenmei Daily Use Products, "westerners are good 
managers does not mean they are automatically good trainers". 
[Goldenberg, 1988, 183] 
In summary, the Chinese government had prepared to utilize 
direct foreign investment several months before December 1978 anj 
started to accept it in December 1978. The new policy of direct 
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foreign investment had taken shape by July 1979 and was designed 
to acquire foreign technology and managerial skills and to 
increase industrial export, employment, government revenue, and 
capital inputs in China's light and tertiary industries. However, 
there were some constraints on the design of the new policy, such 
as China's preference of a centralized socialist economy, the 
negative attitude towards capitalism, the emphasis on self-
reliance, the fear of imperialism, foreigners' unwillingness to 
export advanced technology to China and foreign managers' 
reluctancy to work in China. 
11.0 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the adoption of the PRC's nev policy 
concerning direct foreign investment in 1978 was brought about by 
five major factors• The increasing emphasis on technology 
importation since the early 1970s gradually pushed Chinese 
economic reformers to seek an economical and efficient means to 
import foreign technology. Direct foreign* investment was 
ultimately utilized as such a means in 1978. Between 1977 and 
1978, the Chinese government was searching for more modern 
managerial techniques, and direct foreign investment was soon 
used to meet this demand. Besides the above needs, changes in 
China
1
s political environment, restructuring of China's economy 
and improved foreign relations also contributed, in different 
degrees, to the rise of the new policy. The fall of the Gang of 
Four in October 1976 and the subsequent rise of Deng Xiaoping 
changed China's attitude towards direct foreign investment from 
rejection to utilization, China's restructuring of its economy in 
1978 made possible the establishment of autonomous enterprises 
with direct foreign investment. Finally, China's friendly 
relations with capitalist countries in the 1970s provided a good 
environment for close economic co-operation between China and the 
capitalist countries. 
This research has revealed that China,s new policy 
concerning direct foreign investment was a brand new and 




. although China accepted a little direct foreign investments, it 
did not use direct foreign investment to expedite its economic 
development. Instead, other economic development strategies were 
employed. In the 1950s, China relied on a great amount of Soviet 
loans and technical aid. In the 1960s and early 1970s, it 
emphasized self-reliance and neglected foreign capital, 
technology, managerial skills, and so on. Between 1973 and 1977, 
it vras depending more on the purchase of foreign technology. 
However, in 1978, direct foreign investment was employed for the 
first time as a means to promote China
1
 s economic and 
technological development. Besides, direct foreign investment 
performed a distinctive function. Although the economists and 
politicians in the PRC regarded it as a kind of foreign fund, its 
function was in fact different from that of indirect foreign 
investment. This thesis poses that the primary purpose of China's 
new policy concerning direct foreign investment was not to absorb 
foreign funds, machines and eqiiipment, but to import technology 
and managerial techniques. 
This study has observed a historical continuity in the 
course of change. 、 Although China's policy concerning direct 
foreign investment changed rapidly and radically in 1978, some 
things remained unchanged. China was still afraid of direct 
foreign investment. Fearing that foreigners might control the 
equity joint ventures, China required the director of the Board 
of Directors had to be Chinese. To avoid loss of sovereignty, 
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China offered no protection against possible nationalization for 
foreign investors. In order to prevent foreigners from dominating 
its economy, China used direct： foreign investment to serve only 
as a supplement to its economy while still stressing self-
reliance, Although wholly foreign-owned enterprises were 
permitted, its number was extremely small and would not dominate 
China's economy. As a consequence, China remained an independent, 
socialist, and self-reliant, state. 
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